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1
See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1625, 1626
(1992); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the
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gress enacted general restrictions on the ability of foreigners to enter the country,2 although restrictions at the state and local level
had been around for much longer.3 Convention also dates the origin of the federal constitutional law of immigration to roughly the
same period. In the Chinese Exclusion Case, announced at the
height of the nativism of the 1880s, the Supreme Court upheld the
power of Congress to restrict entry by Chinese nationals.4 Identifying the nation’s power to control its borders as an inherent incident
of sovereignty under the law of nations, the Court found that this
power to exclude aliens seeking entry was not subject to any constitutional restriction.5 Thus was born the plenary power doctrine. In
relatively short order, the Court extended the plenary power doctrine to encompass Congress’s power to provide for the deportation of previously admitted resident aliens as well.6
As with their view of its nineteenth-century origins, scholars today also agree that the plenary power doctrine provides a poorly
theorized framework for immigration constitutionalism.7 Under the
Removal of Aliens, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 961, 1004 (1998) [hereinafter Neuman, Habeas
Corpus] (dating the modern period of federal immigration regulation to 1875).
2
See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477–78 (excluding prostitutes and
convicts from admission to the United States).
3
As Professor Neuman shows, restrictions had long been around at both the state
and local levels. See Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants,
Borders, and Fundamental Law 19–43 (1996) [hereinafter Neuman, Strangers] (noting
the myth that the nation’s borders were open until the 1870s and recounting the various forms of legislation, often at the state and local level, that served to exclude alien
criminals, paupers, the diseased, and people of color). Federal laws adopted before
1875 also excluded slaves, “coolies,” and perhaps some free people of color to the extent already barred by state law. Id. at 34–41.
4
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,
609 (1889).
5
Id.
6
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 723–24 (1893). We discuss Chae
Chan Ping, Fong Yue Ting, and the origins of the plenary power doctrine at greater
length in Part IV. For comprehensive treatment of the plenary power doctrine, see
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and the Judiciary: Law and Politics in Britain and
America 181 (1987) (tracing the origins of plenary power to the Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849)); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle
of Plenary Power, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 255, 256–57 [hereinafter Legomsky, Plenary
Power].
7
See Legomsky, Plenary Power, supra note 6, at 260–78 (criticizing as inadequate a
series of possible justifications for the plenary power doctrine); see also Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion
and its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 885–86 (1987) (arguing that the Court’s rec-
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plenary power doctrine, Congress enjoys what the Supreme Court
has sometimes described as essentially unfettered power over the
treatment of aliens. In its baldest formulation, the plenary power
doctrine holds that certain categories of aliens must accept whatever rights Congress chooses to confer or withhold.8 At the same
time, the Court has often subjected the removal or deportation of
aliens and other features of immigration law to some of the rigors
of procedural due process analysis.9 Perhaps most dramatically, the
Court held in 2001 that aliens were entitled to a presumption
against retroactivity and to judicial review of removal decisions despite the efforts of Congress to impose a different dispensation.10
The Court framed its approach to the legislation in terms of the
need to avoid the serious constitutional question that would arise
from foreclosure of all review.11 Subsequent decisions, including
those growing out of challenges to detention at Guantanamo Bay,

ognition of unfettered power in Congress was contrary both to norms of limited constitutionalism and to the human rights commitments that defined our highest national
aspirations); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the
Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 105–06 (1998) (arguing that substantive
due process principles should limit Congress’s ability under the plenary power doctrine to impose retroactive changes in immigration law); Motomura, supra note 1, at
1626–32 (arguing for an alternative set of constitutional norms, drawn from special
rules of statutory interpretation and from the rules of procedural due process that the
Court has grudgingly made available to aliens seeking to resist removal); cf. Ann
Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 Geo. L.J.
1015, 1018–19 (2006) (exploring the nineteenth-century development of the presumption in favor of prospective legislation as it applied to public and private rights).
8
See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–32 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 588–90 (1952); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713–14; Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609; see also United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (declaring that any procedure Congress chooses “is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned”).
9
See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–34 (1982) (extending procedural protections to a resident alien who was excluded upon his return to the United States after a
short trip abroad).
10
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314–20 (2001) (concluding that Congress had not
clearly stated its intention to preclude review of certain removal issues through habeas corpus).
11
See id. at 300–05. We discuss St. Cyr in Part IV below.
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have strengthened the Court in its view that constitutional guarantees provide aliens with some assurance of judicial review.12
Complicating matters further, the Court has sometimes suggested that immigration matters fall within the scope of something
called the “public rights” exception to Article III.13 The well-known
terms of Article III vest the judicial power of the United States in
federal courts, supreme and inferior, staffed by life-tenured and
salary-protected judges.14 Under the public rights exception as
sometimes articulated, Congress has the power to allow nonArticle III tribunals to adjudicate and resolve disputes between individuals and the federal government. If rigorously applied, the
public rights doctrine would seemingly authorize Congress to assign the adjudication of immigration matters to executive branch
agencies and to immunize agency decisions from judicial review.
Strong statements of the public rights exception to Article III draw
strength from the plenary power doctrine but conflict with the
Court’s reliance on procedural due process and habeas corpus as
complementary tools with which to preserve judicial oversight.15
Scholars have called attention to the puzzles presented by the
Court’s distinction between constitutional substance and constitutional procedure and the complicating niceties of the public rights
doctrine. Professor Daniel Meltzer, writing in the wake of the immigration reforms of the mid-1990s, described the uneasy world
that the Court had created with its deference on matters of substance and its closer attention to issues of procedure. How did it
12
See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (holding that Congress unconstitutionally suspended writ of habeas corpus in restricting judicial review of a
Guantanamo Bay detention).
13
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) (including immigration among matters “involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial
power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of
the United States, as it may deem proper” (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken
Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855))).
14
On the power of Congress to assign matters within the judicial power of the
United States to non-Article III tribunals, see James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals,
Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 643,
649–51 (2004); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 916–18 (1988) (arguing that Article III requires federal courts to conduct appellate review of legislative court judgments and
administrative agencies).
15
We criticize the plenary power doctrine in Part IV below.
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happen, Professor Meltzer wondered, that the federal government
came to be bound by the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause in
dealing with aliens but not by the same Amendment’s equal protection component?16 Similarly, Professor Hiroshi Motomura has
ruminated at some length about the Court’s distinction between
substance and procedure. Describing what he called a procedural
due process exception to the plenary power doctrine, Professor
Motomura viewed procedural protections as surrogates for the
substantive constitutional rights that the Court has so far largely
declined to recognize.17
The case of the Uighurs, long detained at Guantanamo Bay, illustrates some of the perplexing consequences of our substantively
thin and procedurally thick immigration Constitution. The Bush
administration detained the Uighurs after learning that some may
have received military training at camps run by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Eventually it appeared that at least some of the Uighurs,
an ethnic minority in China, secured this training not to attack the
United States but to defend themselves against the Chinese government. Through the ups and downs of habeas litigation, counsel
for the Uighurs eventually established the elements of a claim for
release from detention at Guantanamo Bay.18 Despite the efforts of
a federal district judge who viewed their continued detention as
unjustifiable, the government successfully argued that the Uighurs
had no right to admission to the United States.19 The constitutional

16
See Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 Geo.
L.J. 2537, 2578–79 (1998).
17
See Motomura, supra note 1, at 1632–35. Taking a slightly different tack, Professor Nancy Morawetz has argued that substantive due process may limit Congress’s
ability to impose retroactive changes in immigration law. Morawetz, supra note 7, at
105–06.
18
For an account of the events up to and including the district court’s order to release the Uighurs into the United States, see In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008).
19
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1025–29 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (concluding that
Uighurs cannot claim release from custody, despite the government’s admission that
they do not qualify for continued detention as enemy combatants), cert. granted, 130
S. Ct. 458 (Oct. 20, 2009). Various developments may moot the Kiyemba litigation
before its anticipated judicial resolution in June 2010. See Order in Pending Case,
Kiyemba v. Obama (08-1234) (Feb. 12, 2010).
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invalidity of their confinement at Guantanamo Bay did not translate into a constitutional right to enter the United States.20
This Article offers a new account of the nation’s immigration
Constitution. Instead of building on the plenary power doctrine of
the 1880s, the Article focuses on the little-known body of federal
immigration and naturalization law that arose during the early Republic of the 1790s. Although it has for a variety of reasons attracted little attention from scholars, the constitutional law of the
early Republic recognized that Congress was to have broad (substantive) power to fashion immigration policy but was required to
act in accordance with norms of procedural regularity. In particular, while Congress was free to define the classes of persons who
were entitled to seek naturalized citizenship, the Constitution requires Congress to act in accordance with norms of prospectivity,
uniformity, and transparency. Embedded in the naturalization
clause, which empowers Congress to “establish an uniform rule of
Naturalization,”21 these values of procedural regularity formed the
core of the early Republic’s immigration Constitution and can do
much to complement the procedural protections found in the due
process clause.
A range of factors explains why this body of constitutional law
has escaped sustained attention. To begin with, the constitutional
law of the early Republic was largely applied in the halls of Congress, rather than in the federal courts. Early federal laws implementing the requirement of a uniform rule of naturalization produced little in the way of reported decisions that would shed light
on the judiciary’s role in the process or on the constitutional
framework within which Congress was to operate.22 Like much of
the early Republic’s administrative law, the application of immigration and naturalization law was hidden in the discretionary actions
20

During June 2009, the Obama administration secured asylum for the Uighurs in
such disparate countries as Bermuda, Palau, and elsewhere. See William Glaberson, 6
Guantánamo Detainees Are Released to Other Countries as Questions Linger, N.Y.
Times, June 12, 2009, at A6.
21
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
22
In one little known case, Ex parte Fitzbonne (1800) (unreported), the Supreme
Court held that citizens of France were entitled to naturalization, notwithstanding a
provision of federal law barring naturalization of citizens of a country at war with the
United States. For an account, see 8 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court
of the United States, 1789–1800, at 389–90 (Maeva Marcus ed., 2007).
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of government officers, mainly judges and magistrates.23 Apart
from its being invisible to an eye trained to examine judicial decisions, the early constitutional law was built around the naturalization clause, a seemingly unlikely source for the development of a
constitutional law of immigration. The clause itself occasioned little
debate at the Philadelphia Convention that would shed light on its
important procedural features. In addition, the clause does not obviously extend beyond issues of citizenship to govern issues of immigration. Scholars who date federal immigration law to 1875 correctly identify general congressional restrictions on entry; early
citizenship rules did not bar anyone from entering the country.24
But two factors—the practical reality of trans-Atlantic migration
and the rules of property ownership—combined to make naturalization virtually synonymous with the immigration policy of the
early Republic.25 The trans-Atlantic voyage to the United States

23
On the sources of antebellum administrative law, see William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America 9–12 (1996).
Rarely would the published judicial record reveal the factors that influenced citizenship decisions; rarely did first-instance decisions occasion appellate review; and rarely
did the courts record their legal interpretations in passing on naturalization petitions.
For instance, naturalization decisions of the district court of New York simply recite
the facts and declare the petitioner to be a naturalized citizen. See infra note 155.
24
Chief Justice Taney, dissenting from the invalidation of state restrictions on the
entry of aliens, gave voice to the intuitive distinction between citizenship and immigration. See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 483 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that the “nature of our institutions under the Federal government
made it a matter of absolute necessity that [the naturalization] power should be confided to the government of the Union, where all the States were represented, and
where all had a voice; a necessity so obvious that no statesman could have overlooked
it. The article has nothing to do with the admission or rejection of aliens, nor with
immigration, but with the rights of citizenship. Its sole object was to prevent one State
from forcing upon all the others, and upon the general government, persons as citizens whom they were unwilling to admit as such.”).
25
For the view that the length, cost, and difficulty of the trans-Atlantic voyage ensured that it was “almost always a one-way trip,” see Raymond L. Cohn, Mass Migration Under Sail: European Immigration to the Antebellum United States 1, 10 (2009).
Cohn observed that later in the nineteenth century, steamship travel shortened the
trip from months to some ten days and sharply reduced its cost. Id. at 1, 12, 125, 223–
26. The change in the cost and mode of travel may have changed the nature of immigration. While immigrants in the age of sail could not practically consider anything
but permanent relocation, the steamship enabled immigrants to come and go. William
J. Bromwell, History of Immigration to the United States 18 (1856) (reporting that
the emigration of Chinese to America was inconsiderable until 1854, when some
13,000 Chinese laborers arrived, and noting that a growing number of immigrants
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from Europe was difficult, expensive, and time consuming. Immigrants spent anywhere from six weeks to three months on board a
ship, paid substantial fees to book the passage, and did not expect
to return to their countries of origin.26 Scholarship on immigration
during the founding period thus makes clear that those sailing to
the new world were (almost invariably) making a permanent decision to relocate.27 The rules of property ownership explain why
those contemplating a one-way trip to the United States would
have paid close attention to naturalization rules in making their
decision. At common law, in England and in the colonies, and
newly independent states of North America, aliens could not obtain a fee simple title to real property.28 While there were various
ways to temporize—aliens could obtain “denizen” status, for example, and the right to hold a life estate in real property—the
common law barrier to land ownership played a central role in immigration calculus.29 Inasmuch as the prospect of owning cheap fertile land was central to the pre-industrial American dream of economic advancement, immigrants to British North America during
the second half of the eighteenth century would know that their future property ownership rights depended on their ability to secure
naturalized citizenship.30
came with the intention of returning to their country of origin rather than residing
permanently in the United States).
For an account of common law property ownership rights in England, see 2 William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *356–57. On the way prevailing
conceptions of property rights affected aliens in colonial America, see Polly J. Price,
Alien Land Restrictions in the American Common Law: Exploring the Relative
Autonomy Paradigm, 43 Am. J. Legal Hist. 152, 159 (1999) (noting that aliens could
not inherit land from others and could not pass good title to their children upon
death; even their ownership of property during their lifetimes was subject to attack by
way of escheat, a state-initiated legal process that triggered the forfeiture of title to
the state).
26
See supra note 25.
27
See id.
28
See id.
29
On the nature of alien property disabilities and the Crown’s practice of denization, see 2 Blackstone, supra note 25, at *356–57 and infra notes 73–80 and accompanying text.
30
See Bernard Bailyn, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America
on the Eve of the Revolution 26 (1986). Bailyn emphasizes both the comparatively
vast scale of immigration in the years between 1760 and 1775 and the way in which
the pre-industrial immigration of the eighteenth century differed from its nineteenthcentury counterpart. As Bailyn explains, immigration was not, “in its main impact, an
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For the Framers, then, the law of naturalization played a central
role in structuring the incentives and decisions of prospective immigrants.31 We can see the connection between property ownership, naturalization policy, and immigration in a variety of sources,
including the population grievance in the Declaration of Independence. In complaining that the King had acted to prevent the
population of the United States, Congress first identified acts that
were said to have obstructed “the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners.”32 Without the promise of naturalized citizenship, in short,
America could not attract immigrants to the new world. Connected
to this interference with the states’ control over naturalization, the
Crown had made it more difficult for new settlers to secure “Ap-

urban phenomenon” but was one in which European artisans and laborers were settling on the land in America. Id. By Bailyn’s count, over 125,000 immigrants arrived
from the British Isles alone in the fifteen years preceding the Revolution, an average
rate of 15,000 per year (or roughly the total estimated population of Boston in that
day). Id. Thousands of German-speaking immigrants from the Rhine valley were also
entering through the port of Philadelphia. Scholars estimate that some 90,000 to
100,000 such immigrants arrived over the course of the eighteenth century. See Georg
Fertig, Transatlantic Migration from the German-Speaking Parts of Central Europe,
1600–1800: Proportions, Structures, and Explanations, in Europeans on the Move:
Studies in European Migration, 1500–1800, at 192, 201–02 (Nicholas Canny ed., 1994);
cf. David Hawke, The Colonial Experience 364 (1966) (reporting that German immigration “dried up” with the outbreak of the Revolution).
31
In suggesting a connection between naturalization rules and immigration choices,
this Article adopts a view comparable to that explored in Adam B. Cox, Immigration
Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 341, 361–62 (2008) (suggesting that
rules governing the treatment of aliens after they arrive in the United States will
shape their decisions to enter the country). Obviously the rule of naturalization was
not the only factor that influenced immigration decisions. Immigrants were influenced
by a range of factors, including the prospects for financial gain in the new world and
strength of the cultural and social connections they would expect to find upon arrival.
See Marianne Wokeck, Harnessing the Lure of the “Best Poor Man’s Country”: The
Dynamics of German-Speaking Immigration to North America, 1683–1783, in “To
Make America”: European Emigration in the Early Modern Period 204, 205–06 (Ida
Altman & James Horn eds., 1991) (explaining that a full account of emigration to
British North America must take account of both factors that pushed migrants away
from Europe and pulled them toward the new world). Yet settlement on the land
played an important role in the pre-industrial immigration calculus and rules of naturalization were central to land ownership and to full membership in the community.
Cf. Robert J. Steinfeld, Subjectship, Citizenship, and the Long History of Immigration
Regulation, 19 Law & Hist. Rev. 645, 650–51 (2001) (suggesting that citizenship-based
property ownership rules in the colonial period, including the alien property disability, would operate effectively as a rejection of immigration).
32
The Declaration of Independence para. 9 (U.S. 1776).
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propriations of Land.” In suggesting a linkage between naturalization policy, land ownership, and immigration, the Declaration simply recited the conventional wisdom of the day.33
The naturalization law of the early Republic has a variety of lessons to teach us about the scope of congressional power over immigration law, not all of them welcome. To begin with, Congress
exercised broad power to define which classes of persons were entitled to citizenship. In 1790, Congress limited naturalized citizenship to “free white person[s],” thereby excluding aliens of color.34 If
the Constitution broadly defined Congress’s substantive authority
(in ways that anticipate the plenary power doctrine), it took a
much narrower view of the manner in which Congress was to legislate. Thus, the naturalization clause required Congress to establish
a nationally uniform rule and to do so through public laws of general applicability. This was a pro-immigration stance: by ruling out
private bills (a form of naturalization common both in England and
in some colonies),35 the Framers required Congress to adopt public
laws that would place the administration of naturalization law in
the hands of the executive and judicial branches of government.
Particularly when read against the backdrop of the restrictive and
shadowy world of legislative naturalization practices,36 public laws
were understood to simplify the process of naturalization, to make
it more transparent, to make it less expensive, and, as a practical

33
Similar links appear in the debates over naturalization in the First Congress and in
the revealing comments of James Madison, which we discuss in Part III.
34
An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790)
[hereinafter 1790 Act]. Such a restriction on access to citizenship reveals several
things about the early Republic. Southern states obviously viewed slavery as central
to the preservation of their plantation economies; subjugation of people of color was
seen as essential to the preservation of the institution of slavery. The North’s willingness to accept such restrictions reflected the same spirit of compromise that underlay
its willingness to frame a Constitution that acknowledged and supported Southern
slavery. Perhaps most significantly for our purposes, the provision illustrates the perceived breadth of Congress’s substantive control over the definition of rights to citizenship.
35
Legislative petitions were a prominent means by which individuals sought naturalization in England (and in the colonies) during the eighteenth century. See 2 Frederick Clifford, A History of Private Bill Legislation 725 (Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.
1968) (1887).
36
See infra notes 81–95 and accompanying text.
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matter, to provide for the naturalization of more applicants for citizenship.37
More generally, the requirement of an established rule of naturalization was understood to foreclose retroactive changes in the
terms on which individuals were to be admitted to citizenship. This
Article identifies, both in the drafting of the Constitution and in its
early congressional implementation, a strong commitment to legislative prospectivity in naturalization law. The requirement of
prospectivity reflected the perception that those who immigrated
to the United States were entitled to rely on the rules of naturalization that governed admission to citizenship at the time of their arrival. Thus, when Congress changed the rules, it was careful to create exceptions for aliens who already resided in the United States
and could claim citizenship under the earlier rules.38 Even in the
development of the restrictive and short-lived naturalization law of
1798, a measure shaped by the urgent nationalism that arose during
the quasi-war with France, the Federalist Congress took steps to
moderate the law’s retroactive features.39 Jeffersonians fully restored the norm of prospectivity in the naturalization act of 1802,
where it remained until Congress’s ill-conceived decision in 1839
(fifty years after the first naturalization act) to adopt a private bill
in response to an individual petition.40
The constitutional law of the early Republic provides a framework for evaluating the power of Congress and the role of the federal courts that can help to solve some modern immigration puzzles. Today’s plenary power doctrine finds a measure of support in
the broad authority of Congress to fashion rules of naturalization.
Congress has the power to decide who can pursue naturalized citizenship, and on what terms; the power to regulate entry into the
United States for those seeking naturalized citizenship, or some
lesser status, would seem to follow. But those responsible for im37
Congress has failed to heed this admonition, with predictable consequences: arbitrary and inconsistent results, favoritism to the well-connected, and corruption. In the
FBI’s 1980 ABSCAM sting operation, members of Congress were convicted of accepting bribes in exchange for agreeing to push private naturalization bills. See Bernadette Maguire, Immigration: Public Legislation and Private Bills 227, 230–31
(1997).
38
See infra Section III.B.
39
See infra notes 216–18 and accompanying text.
40
See infra notes 178 (private bill), 219–25 (1802 Act).
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migration policy in the early Republic did not conceive of congressional power as unbridled. In particular, the Framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress who applied its terms in the
early years were strongly committed to norms of prospectivity, uniformity, and transparency. Congress can change the rules, on this
account, but must respect the reliance interests of those who have
established a residence in the United States and have complied
with the rules in place at the time of their arrival.
These early Republic constitutional norms provide an important
set of limits on Congress’s authority over immigration law. By ruling out retrospective changes in the rules, the naturalization clause
qualifies the plenary power doctrine and bolsters the Court’s result
in INS v. St. Cyr.41 In addition, the naturalization clause calls into
question the power of Congress to adopt private naturalization
bills. This rejection of congressional case-by-case management of
citizenship issues provides support for Justice Powell’s conclusion
in INS v. Chadha.42 It also calls into question the continued viability
of the public rights exception for disputes between aliens and the
federal government over the application of immigration and naturalization law. Lacking power to exercise case-by-case control over
the grant or denial of naturalized citizenship, Congress must establish public laws of general applicability and leave the application of
standards to executive and judicial branch officials. Congress’s inability to claim discretionary control over individual cases distinguishes immigration law from other areas of law (the distribution
of monetary benefits and public lands) to which the public rights
doctrine applies.43
In exploring the elements of the early Republic’s immigration
and naturalization Constitution, this Article proceeds in four parts.
Part I explores the eighteenth-century origins of the naturalization
clause, concentrating on the practical reality of immigration and
the way naturalization rules shaped migration decisions. Part II
41

533 U.S. 289 (2001).
462 U.S. 919, 960 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (“When Congress finds that a
particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria for permanent residence in this
country it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of separation of
powers.”).
43
In Part IV, we distinguish the Constitution’s broad grant of congressional power
over spending and property from its requirement that Congress establish a uniform
rule of naturalization.
42
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looks specifically at the framing of the naturalization clause and
the way it (in turn) framed immigration policy during the early Republic. Not only does the text of the naturalization clause rule out
the adoption of private naturalization bills, but also it requires
Congress to act prospectively in making changes to the law. Part
III explores early congressional practice. Early legislators were
well aware of the importance of prospective lawmaking in naturalization matters and consciously avoided private legislation and retroactive changes in the rules governing resident aliens.
Part IV of the Article applies the lessons of the early Republic’s
immigration Constitution to current problems in immigration law.
Perhaps most significantly, the requirement that Congress establish
a uniform rule narrows the plenary power doctrine. Congress cannot alter the rules and make them retroactively applicable to aliens
who have lawfully established residence in the United States. Part
IV also calls into question broad versions of the public rights doctrine. While Congress has power to assign discretionary decisions
to executive branch officers, it cannot reserve that discretion to itself (as it attempted to do in INS v. Chadha). Nor can Congress insulate immigration and naturalization decisions from the oversight
of the federal courts. Like some expansive conceptions of plenary
power, the public rights doctrine must yield to ensure the enforcement of constitutional limits on Congress’s authority. A brief conclusion follows.
I. PRELUDE: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN NORTH AMERICA BEFORE
1787
Looking back on the growth of British North America, those
who met in Philadelphia in 1787 to form a more perfect union did
not envision a need for a restrictive immigration policy.44 The colo-

44
Two prominent members of the Philadelphia Convention, Alexander Hamilton
and James Wilson, came to America from elsewhere in the British Empire. Hamilton
arrived in 1772 from the British West Indies. Broadus Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton:
Youth to Maturity, 1755–1788, at 34–35 (1957). Wilson arrived from Scotland in 1765.
Charles Page Smith, James Wilson: Founding Father 20–21 (1956). As native-born
members of the British Empire, both Hamilton and Wilson were entitled to the rights
of Englishmen in colonial North America. Both were free, moreover, after the Declaration of Independence, to choose either British or American allegiance and both
chose America and the cause of independence.
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nies had welcomed immigration; indeed, they competed with one
another to recruit émigrés from the British Isles and the continent.45 Elite opinion held that immigration was a source of national
wealth, as new arrivals broadened the productive capacity of the
nation and expanded the domestic demand for consumer goods.
Great Britain shared this view; indeed, it had worked hard to stem
the tide of emigration to its North American colonies in the years
just prior to the Revolution in the belief that the loss of population
threatened the mother country.46 Mercantile theory called for the
hoarding of resources, and people (especially the skilled workers
and farmers who were leaving the great estates in droves) were
among the resources to be hoarded.47
The growing tension between the colonies and Great Britain
over immigration policy was nicely captured in the Declaration of
Independence. Among its grievances was the contention that the
King
[H]as endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for
that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreign45
Before the Constitution’s ratification, the colonies and the newly independent
states competed with one another to attract new immigrants. See infra text accompanying note 117 (quoting Pinckney’s description of differing immigration policies of the
newer and older states). See Hawke, supra note 30, at 371–72 (reporting that Massachusetts for a time required only a one-year residence for naturalization and that
Pennsylvania required only two years). Short waiting periods in the colonies contrasted with the seven-year residency requirement of the 1740 Act of Parliament. Colonial naturalization, however, did not necessarily confer rights good throughout the
Empire. Id.
46
See Daniel Statt, Foreigners and Englishmen: The Controversy over Immigration
and Population, 1660–1760, at 49 (1995) (“[T]he more people the more trade; the
more trade, the more money; the more money, the more strength; and the more
strength, the greater the nation.” (quoting article by Daniel Defoe circa 1709)).
47
For an account of the importance of national population to European thinkers,
see Henry Steele Commager, The Empire of Reason: How Europe Imagined and
America Realized the Enlightenment 97–99 (1977) (contrasting the concern in
Europe over shrinking populations with the perception that numbers were growing in
America); see also Statt, supra note 46, at 49 (describing the preoccupation with
population as the “common intellectual currency” of early modern Europe); cf. Benjamin Smith Baron, Observations on the Progress of Population, and the Probabilities
of the Duration of Human Life in the United States of America (1791), quoted in
Commager, supra at 99 & n.21, 100 (“[N]umbers of people constitute . . . the strength
and riches of a state; that country, whose population is rapidly advancing, may fairly
be said to be increasing in both these concomitants of national prosperity, with proportionable celerity.”).
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ers; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither,
48
and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.

Both in its general thrust and in its bill of particulars, this grievance
tells us much about the immigration policy of the day. We hear no
complaints that Great Britain had been foisting off unwholesome
immigrants (convicts and paupers) on its colonies, although it indeed had such a policy.49 Instead, the grievance focused on measures—specifically, naturalization rules—that had impeded the
“population of these States.” This emphasis shows that the United
States embraced new immigrants, in large part for the wealth they
would bring or generate on their arrival.
To account for the American embrace of new immigration and
to see why naturalization played a central role in immigration policy, one must understand the way the market structured immigration decisions in the pre-industrial world of the eighteenth century.
Everyone who came to America from Europe (and Africa) arrived
on board a sailing ship. The voyage took anywhere from six weeks
to three months, and it cost a good deal of money.50 Most accounts
of the price of a passenger ticket agree that the going rate ranged
from £3–5, a figure approaching the average annual wage of many
tenant farmers and laborers in the British Isles.51 Only those who

48

The Declaration of Independence para. 9 (U.S. 1776).
For an account of Parliament’s decision in 1717 to encourage the transportation of
convicts to North America through indentured servitude, see Bailyn, supra note 30, at
292–95. Some colonies adopted measures to limit the influx of convicts. Id. at 55. In
the years just prior to the Revolution, around 960 transported convicts were arriving
each year. Id. at 295.
50
Emigration from Europe to North America was available only to the relatively
well-to-do until credit and labor markets developed the contract of indentured servitude to finance the voyage. Wokeck, supra note 31, at 204–05, 217.
51
Professor Cohn reports that most sailing ships specialized in carrying cargo, not
passengers. Cohn, supra note 25, at 60. As a result, passenger space was in short supply and quite expensive. As late as the period from 1810–1820, a ticket from Liverpool to New York cost £7–12, a figure that would virtually exhaust the estimated £10–
15 annual income of an Irish farmer before the potato famine. Id. Others identify
similar price ranges. See, e.g., Bailyn, supra note 30, at 166 (reporting a fare from
Britain to North America in the mid-eighteenth century of £3–4 for an adult); Fertig,
supra note 30, at 216 (reporting that fares remained relatively constant at £5–6 per
passenger to travel from Rotterdam to Philadelphia for the period 1720–1770); see
also Simone A. Wegge, Occupational Self-Selection of European Emigrants: Evidence from Nineteenth Century Hesse-Cassel, 6 Eur. Rev. Econ. Hist. 365, 386 (2002)
49
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could afford passage to the new world could become immigrants.
Not only was the voyage itself expensive, but the time immigrants
spent on board ship was unavailable for more productive pursuits.
Immigrants paid both for their passage and for the food they consumed on board; if they failed to pack enough supplies for the long
voyage, they were forced to purchase food from the captain at inflated prices.52
The financial and temporal demands of the voyage thus prevented many of the poorest, least skilled, and least desirable from
making the trip to the new world.53 But immigration was not solely
or primarily a pursuit of the well-to-do. (Obviously, the financially
and socially secure had little reason to relocate.) Historians agree
that thousands of the middling sorts—farmers, artisans, servants,
and laborers—were among those immigrating to British North
America.54 These immigrants paid for their passage by entering into
contracts of indentured servitude, the terms of which varied with
the skills of the individuals involved.55 In some instances, passen(concluding that it would have cost laborers in Germany anywhere from one to two
years of wages to immigrate to North America).
52
See Cohn, supra note 25, at 152–53.
53
Thus, only the wealthy could immigrate to the new world before the indenture
and labor credit markets developed. See Wokeck, supra note 31, at 204–05. Even
later, when indentured service made the passage affordable to a broader range of
immigrants, scholars have shown that German immigrants had higher rates of literacy
than the folks back home. See Fertig, supra note 30, at 232 (contrasting a literacy rate
of seventy-one percent among German immigrants with a literacy rate in Germany of
only fifty-five percent). In keeping with such findings, others have shown that a disproportionate share of German immigrants were skilled artisans rather than unskilled
laborers. See Wegge, supra note 51, at 378, 382–83 (suggesting that the cost of immigration kept laborers from immigrating in numbers proportional to their representation in the labor market).
54
Bailyn, supra note 30, at 26 (describing the mix of workers coming from the British Isles just prior to the Revolution).
55
Scholars agree on the significance of the contract of indenture in expanding the
flow of immigrants. See Bailyn, supra note 30, at 243 (reporting that half of the immigrants from the British Isles settled in North America as indentured servants); Fertig,
supra note 30, at 216 (identifying the development of an indentured servant market as
crucial to the expansion of immigration); Wokeck, supra note 31, at 217 (noting the
role of indentured servitude in facilitating German immigration to North America).
See generally David W. Galenson, White Servitude in Colonial America: An Economic Analysis (1981). Galenson reports that the length of the period of indentured
service and the amount of “freedom dues” varied with the skill level of the individual.
Id. at 102–03. Contracts for indentured servitude were bought and sold, often while
the servant was still on board the ship in the harbor. Id. at 97.
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gers contracted directly with the captain of the vessel; these contracts were sold when the voyage ended in America. On other occasions, labor entrepreneurs would recruit particular workers, entering into indentures and paying the passage themselves. Either
way, the arrangements depended on the existence of relatively
well-established labor markets in America, where captains or recruiters could reliably dispose of the contracts of indentured servants. Historians estimate that indentured servitude, although essentially defunct by the early nineteenth century,56 accounted for
something approaching half of all immigration to America in the
eighteenth century.57
Judging from the sentiments expressed in the Declaration of Independence, the arrival in America of thousands of relatively impecunious indentured servants did not pose a social problem. In
many cases, the market for indentured servitude would operate to
prevent new immigrants from becoming a public charge. Indentures required the master to provide the servant with food and
lodging throughout the term of the contract. After the period of
servitude ended, moreover, the contract typically called for the
master to provide the servant with a cash stipend with which to
start a new life.58 In a growing economy, with expanding labor markets and cheap land available on the frontier, Americans viewed
themselves as having little to fear and much to gain from the arrival of masses of indentured servants.
In addition to indentured servants, another stream of immigrants
headed more or less directly to the land, either buying property
outright or taking up a grant under a land scheme promoted by
speculators. Bernard Bailyn speaks of “an extraordinary flood of
immigration” to America in the 1760s and 1770s, and of a closely
56

On the demise of indentures to finance passage to North America, see Wegge, supra note 31, at 371 (reporting that use of indentures had all but ended by 1830).
57
See Bailyn, supra note 30, at 166, 243 (reporting that indentured servants and redemptioners accounted for approximately forty-eight percent of all immigrants from
the British Isles in the years immediately preceding the Revolution).
58
The freedom dues, as they were known, varied in accordance with the skills of the
servant. Early practice in colonial Virginia was to provide the indentured servant with
fifty acres of land upon conclusion of the period of servitude. See Galenson, supra
note 55, at 11. Galenson reports that colonial law often fixed the amount of freedom
dues, id. at 253 n.17, but skilled laborers could bargain for shorter terms of indenture
and “encouragements of another nature.” Id. at 207 (quoting 1 Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, at 364–65 (1958)).
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associated “sudden and immense spread of settlement in the backcountry of the coastal colonies and in the trans-Appalachian
west.”59 His account of how this immigration occurred identifies a
range of players, including the large (absentee) landowners in British North America (Lord Fairfax in Virginia; the Earl of Granville
in North Carolina); the enterprising middlemen and speculators;
the merchants and captains who arranged the passage of would-be
landowners; and the local notables in England, Scotland, and Ireland, who put together groups of emigrating farmers.60 Package
deals (through which emigrants would obtain title to land and passage across the sea) attracted relatively well-established farmers
and their families, who sought to escape from rising rents and enclosures to an independent life in the new world.61
While direct immigration to farming settlements in North America was possible for subjects of the Crown living anywhere in the
British Isles, foreigners could not quite so confidently settle directly on the land. At common law throughout the British Empire,
aliens could not hold title to real property.62 For the sizable stream
of Swiss-, French-, and German-speaking immigrants, many of
whom entered North America through the port at Philadelphia,
land ownership was not possible until they secured naturalized citizenship or some form of denization (a status conferred by the
Crown that empowered aliens to hold a life estate in real property). Like their British counterparts, these continental Europeans
often paid for their passage to North America by signing contracts
of indenture. Such contracts would necessarily require immigrants
to spend some time in servitude, establishing residency and learning the ways of America. Many speculative land settlement
schemes, moreover, included provisions whereby colonial gover59

Bailyn, supra note 30, at 3.
On large landholders, see id. at 356. As for enterprising middlemen, Bailyn describes the efforts of John Witherspoon, President of what became Princeton University, to recruit immigrants from Scotland. Id. at 390–92. As for local notables, Bailyn
tells the story of James Hogg, an energetic Scotsman who immigrated to North Carolina along with his family and a large group of neighbors. Id. at 506–07.
61
Bailyn reports that many provincial emigrants left the north of England, Scotland,
and Ireland and headed directly to the land. Id. at 203. These rural emigrants tended
to be older, more likely to travel as part of a family, and more likely to pay their own
way. Id. Emigrants from London, by contrast, tended to be young, male, and single,
and financed the trip by agreeing to indentured servitude. Id. at 202.
62
See infra notes 73–80 and 96–99 and accompanying text.
60
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nors would provide new arrivals both a land grant and a form of
denization status.63
The Crown sought to contain the migration of the population to
the frontier. Not only was the rage for speculation and land ownership de-populating the tenant farms in Ireland, northern England,
and Scotland,64 but much of the new settlement was taking place
beyond the Proclamation Line of 1763 in the trans-Appalachian
region that the Crown had promised to reserve for Native Americans.65 To stem the tide, the Crown hit upon three policies, all of
which found their way into the Declaration’s population grievance.
First, the Crown took steps to countermand colonial programs that
were designed to attract new settlers from the British Isles. In 1731,
South Carolina established a program of bounties and benefits to
attract emigrants from Ireland. Other colonies had followed suit.66
But in 1767, citing the need to control British emigration, the
Crown vetoed a Georgia bill that sought to attract new immigrants.
A North Carolina act of 1771 met the same fate.67 These vetoes exemplified the Declaration’s charge that the Crown had refused to
adopt laws “to encourage . . . migrations hither.”68
Second, the Crown sought to end the issuance of large, speculative land grants. In April 1773, the Privy Council prohibited Crown
governors from granting any more land in America pending the
development of a comprehensive policy.69 Behind this temporary
stay was the perception that emigration from Britain had been too
greatly encouraged by the delusional schemes of unscrupulous land

63

See James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship 1608–1870, at
89–96 (1978); see also supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
64
The alarm in England over the loss of tenant farmers and artisans had become
quite general by the 1760s. Tours of the countryside produced gloomy reports of
wholesale emigration, and leading politicians called for measures to restrict emigration. See Bailyn, supra note 30, at 55–56.
65
For an account, see D.W. Meinig, 1 The Shaping of America: A Geographical
Perspective on 500 Years of History: Atlantic America, 1492–1800, at 284–88 (1986)
(explaining that the Proclamation Line of 1763, defined as the top of the Appalachian
Mountains, reserved the interior to Native Americans). Yet with the end of the
French and Indian War, and the absence of French opposition in the interior, British
settlers quickly pushed beyond this boundary. See id. at 287–88, 296.
66
See Bailyn, supra note 30, at 55; Kettner, supra note 63, at 113.
67
See Bailyn, supra note 30, at 55.
68
The Declaration of Independence para. 9 (U.S. 1776).
69
See Bailyn, supra note 30, at 55–56.
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jobbers. Later, in February 1774, the Crown announced its new
policy. Instead of land grants in bulk, all public lands were to be
surveyed and sold in small lots (100 to 1000 acres) at wellpublicized public auctions.70 This policy was expected both to ensure actual settlement on the land (thus guaranteeing that the
Crown would receive its quit rents) and to combat profiteering and
cronyism on the part of colonial governors and their circle.71 From
the colonists’ perspective, as expressed in the Declaration, the new
Crown policy effectively “rais[ed] the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands” and made emigration less attractive.72
The third and final element of the population grievance focused
on colonial naturalization policy. Under the rules of common law,
birthright citizenship extended to all subjects born in the realm under allegiance to the monarch.73 On this view, those born in the
British colonies of North America enjoyed birthright citizenship
and were subjects of the Crown.74 By contrast, those born within,
and owing allegiance to, other nations were aliens,75 and suffered
from a variety of disabilities, including the inability to own land in
England and the British dominions.76 The Crown could obviate
these disabilities of alienage to a limited degree by granting deniza70

Id. at 56.
Id.
72
The Declaration of Independence para. 9 (U.S. 1776).
73
Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 406 (K.B.) (“Every one that is an alien by
birth, may be, or might have been, an enemy by accident: but Calvin could never at
any time be an enemy by any accident; Ergo, he cannot be an alien by birth.”); 1
Blackstone, supra note 25, at *356–57. For an in-depth analysis of Calvin’s Case, see
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 Law & Hist. Rev. 439, 454–58 (2003); Polly J.
Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 Yale J.L. &
Human. 73 (1997). See generally Kettner, supra note 63, at 29.
74
See 1 Sir John Comyns, A Digest of the Laws of England 410–12 (London,
Strahan, Samuel Rose ed., 4th ed. 1800). An important statute, adopted in 1700, conferred birth-right citizenship on the children of aliens born in the colonies. See A.H.
Carpenter, Naturalization in England and the American Colonies, 9 Am. Hist. Rev.
288, 292 (1904).
75
1 Blackstone, supra note 25, at *354; see also 1 Comyns, supra note 74, at 409
(“An alien is one who is born out of the ligeance of the king.”).
76
Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 399; 1 Comyns, supra note 74, at 413, 415; see also 1
Clifford, supra note 35, at 382 (“One of the chief reasons for naturalization was that
aliens could not hold real estate.”). For additional information on land rights of naturalized subjects and denizens, see 1 William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 438 (1953).
71
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tion;77 a denizen could acquire a life estate in real property but
could not always pass title to his heirs.78 In addition, Parliament
could confer full citizenship through the passage of legislation
naturalizing the alien.79 For much of seventeenth century, private
acts of Parliament offered the principal means by which aliens
sought naturalization.80
The private bill process had a number of serious problems, especially for those of modest means who were hoping to acquire land
in the new world.81 Private bills were quite expensive to obtain.82
Parliament, like virtually all government bodies of the day, operated on a fee-based payment system.83 Fees were payable at various
77
1 Comyns, supra note 74, at 418 (“The king only has the prerogative to make any
alien to be a denizen. And cannot grant this prerogative to any other. The usual manner of a denization is by letters patent.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Kettner,
supra note 63, at 30 (“Denization came to be seen as ‘a high and incommunicable
branch of the royal prerogative,’ a grant of the king’s grace by which some, but not all,
privileges of natural-born subjects were conferred.”). For a short period in the late
seventeenth century, the Crown established a liberal denization policy that led to a
sharp spike in the number of such grants conferred. See Statt, supra note 46, at 35.
78
1 Comyns, supra note 74, at 418 (stating that title could be passed to “issue” born
after denization, but not before); Kettner, supra note 63, at 29–30 (“Until about the
fifteenth century no such distinction between naturalization and denization had existed. Rather the king and Parliament worked together in bringing outsiders into the
community of subjects. A foreigner who wished to acquire the status and privileges of
an Englishman would petition Parliament, which would then authorize him to obtain
a grant of royal letters patent under the great seal.”); see also id. at 31 (“The formal
grant of letters patent of denization removed some of the disabilities of alienage restricting property rights.”).
79
1 Comyns, supra note 74, at 411 (“Naturalization can only be by parliament.”); see
also Kettner, supra note 63, at 29, 33–34. In East India Company v. Sandys, counsel
observed in argument that rights and freedom of citizens “ought not to be granted to
aliens, not by the king under his great seal, without the consent of the Lords and
Commons, the representatives of the subjects in parliament.” Id. at 32 (quoting East
India Co. v. Sandys, (1863–1865) 10 S.T. 371, 499).
80
1 Clifford, supra note 35, at 378–83.
81
See Kettner, supra note 63, at 67–69; see also Crosskey, supra note 76, at 488 (asserting that the Framers inserted the uniformity clause in the Constitution in order to
thwart state use of private acts of naturalization which made naturalization “the result
of favoritism and political influence, if not of anything worse”).
82
See Statt, supra note 46, at 34 (describing private bills in Parliament as “slow, expensive, and risky” and citing a House of Commons report that reckoned the cost of a
bill of naturalization at £63, a price “outside the reach of all but the richest of immigrants”).
83
2 Clifford, supra note 35, at 717 (quoting the letters patent that conferred the office of under clerk as requiring the payment of £10, lawful money of Great Britain,
payable half-yearly at the Exchequer, “together with all other rewards, dues, rights,
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stages along the way: upon introduction of the bill, on its official
entry in the rolls, on issuance of a favorable committee report, on
ultimate adoption, and so forth.84 Fees were even charged to have
the bill carried from the House of Commons to the House of
Lords.85 The Speaker of the House and the Chancellor (who served
as the speaker of the House of Lords) both earned enormous incomes from the collection of these fees.86 Lesser figures, including
clerks, scriveners, and tipstaffs also received a portion of such
fees.87 The cost of private legislation made it a practical solution
only for individuals of fairly substantial means.
Parliament experimented with a more affordable (and hence
democratic) mode of naturalization.88 In 1709, Parliament adopted
an “Act for naturalizing Foreign Protestants,” and thus created a
relatively cheap and streamlined, if religiously exclusive, mechanism for conferring naturalization.89 The Act required that the individual seeking naturalization make an oath of allegiance to the
Crown of England, disavow the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, and offer proof of recent (Protestant) religious observance.90 The proceeding was conducted in open court, and cost only
one shilling.91 Afterward, applicants were regarded as natural-born
subjects and their names were entered in the court’s records.92 Tory
opposition to this more streamlined mode of naturalization quickly

profits, commodities, advantages and endowments whatsoever to the said office, after
what manner soever, or however, now or heretofore, anciently appertaining, incident,
accustomed, incumbent, or belonging”); id. at 716–17 (noting the requirement that
those seeking a private bill pay fees to both clerks and high officials and describing
the system as “continually abused by excessive charges”).
84
Id. at 716–18.
85
Id. at 719–20.
86
Id. at 725 (noting that officials in both Houses “had always derived considerable
fees” from naturalization bills).
87
Id. at 717–18.
88
Id. at 725.
89
An Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants, 1708, 7 Ann., c. 5, § 3 (Eng.). For an
account, see Statt, supra note 46, at 35–37 (compiling figures that reveal a significant
increase in the number of naturalizations under the Act of 1709 and attributing the
low number of naturalizations in other periods to the “difficulty and expense involved”).
90
An Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants, 1708, 7 Ann., c. 5, § 2 (Eng.); see
also Kettner, supra note 63, at 70.
91
Kettner, supra note 63, at 70.
92
Id.

PFANDER _WARDON_PREPP

2010]

Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution

3/18/2010 12:47 PM

381

emerged. The Act would, according to its opponents, encourage
immigrants to vote, hold office, intermarry, and eventually, “extinguish the English race.”93 Tories favored a return to the private bill
process so the Parliament could limit naturalization to those aliens
of “individual merit.”94 Such a shift would necessarily limit naturalization to the well-to-do and restore the fee revenue associated
with private legislation. Sure enough, in 1712, when the Tories recaptured Parliament, they repealed the public act and returned to
the costly and restrictive private bill system.95
The return to private legislation posed a problem for the colonies of British North America. Before acquiring land in the new
world, aliens of the “middling sort” were in theory required to obtain either denization or naturalization, a status they could ill afford to pursue in London.96 Understandably, then, land speculators
approached the colonial governors and assemblies to secure the
sort of denizen or citizen status they needed to attract immigrants.
Governors granted denization for a time, and colonies developed
their own naturalization policies, subject to a degree of oversight
by the Crown and Privy Council, as part of a predictable form of
competition for new settlers.97 Growth and settlement naturally increased the wealth of the colonies and, not incidentally, lined the
pockets of colonial governors, who received fee payments themselves for denizations and from settlers who took up new land

93

Id. at 70–71.
Id. at 71.
95
Id. at 72.
96
Cora Start, Naturalization in the English Colonies in America, in Annual Report
of the American Historical Association for the Year 1893, at 319–20 (1894); see also
Kettner, supra note 63, at 66–67.
97
Kettner, supra note 63, at 76. As Kettner explains:
By the end of the seventeenth century the colonial governments, acting on dubious legal authority, had already established a variety of procedures for incorporating aliens into the local communities. In contrast to the restrictive policies
favored in London, the acts passed by colonial legislators granted aliens extensive rights and benefits. The American governments gave little attention to
theoretical limitations on naturalization and denization—indeed, their actions
often displayed either an extensive ignorance of or a blatant disregard for those
limitations. Survival, population growth, and economic expansion—not doctrinal consistency—dictated the course of colonial policy.
Id. at 78.
94
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grants.98 With competition for settlers came some slackening of
standards; some colonies refused to recognize other colonial grants
of citizenship and denization, and the Privy Council overrode certain colonial naturalization procedures.99
Parliament responded to the demand for a system of naturalization with the passage of a second public act in 1740.100 Designed to
provide a public mechanism for naturalization, the Act of 1740 imposed a uniform rule throughout the British Empire.101 Applicants
were required to reside for at least seven years in their colony,
prove that they were religiously observant Protestants, and have
their names entered in local court records.102 The Act prescribed a
uniform fee for naturalization, which was no more than two shillings, and further provided for the issuance of certificates of naturalization that entitled the new British subjects to the “rights of
Englishmen” throughout the realm.103 In 1773, at the same time the
Crown was tightening the rules for the transfer of public lands and
vetoing laws to encourage emigration from Britain, Parliament
clarified that the Act of 1740 was meant to be exclusive. By declaring the exclusivity of the 1740 Act, Parliament effectively banned
naturalization under the more lenient colonial naturalization laws
and practices.104 It was the Act of 1773 that gave rise to the naturalization grievance in the Declaration of Independence, which described the Crown as having obstructed “the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners.”105

98
Id. at 83, 119–21 (observing that Pennsylvania colonial proprietors successfully
opposed legislation that would have deprived them of the fee revenue associated with
re-grants of land to survivors of aliens whose land escheated to the Crown upon their
death).
99
Id. at 119; see also Start, supra note 96, at 320 (describing “two species [of naturalization] in the colonies—naturalization as prescribed by English law and naturalization by the colonists, by methods of their own adoption”).
100
An Act for Naturalizing Such Foreign Protestants, and Others Therein Mentioned, as Are Settled, or Shall Settle, in Any of His Majesty’s Colonies in America,
1740, 13 Geo. II, c. 7 (Eng.); see also Kettner, supra note 63, at 74.
101
Kettner, supra note 63, at 74.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 75.
104
An Act Amending the Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants, 1773, 13 Geo.
III, c. 21 (Eng.).
105
The Declaration of Independence para. 9 (U.S. 1776); see Kettner, supra note 63,
at 105.
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Following the conclusion of hostilities and the negotiation of the
1783 Treaty of Peace, naturalization policy fell to the states and
they responded with a profusion of approaches meant to attract
new immigrants from Europe.106 Thus, the Pennsylvania Constitution allowed any foreigner “of good character” who was willing to
swear an oath of allegiance to purchase land in the Commonwealth. After one year, the newly arrived Pennsylvanian became a
free denizen, with most of the rights of a natural-born citizen, and a
full citizen one year later.107 Similarly liberal provisions appeared in
the constitutions of Vermont and North Carolina.108 Many states—
including Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia—
defined the rights of naturalization by statute, with more and less
liberal provisions.109 The southern states tended to require longer
residency periods, invariably limited the right of naturalization to
“free white persons,” and sometimes imposed limits on admission
to full rights of citizenship.110 In South Carolina, for example, full
citizenship required the adoption of a private bill.111 New England
states, which had refrained from encouraging immigration from
European countries other than England, similarly relied on private
legislation and failed to adopt any general or public law of naturalization.112
Interstate mobility inevitably put pressure on the states’ ability
to maintain restrictive views of citizenship.113 After the Articles of
106

Id.
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 215.
110
Kettner, supra note 63, at 215–16. Virginia passed an act in 1779 admitting all
“white persons born within the territory and all who had resided there for the two
years preceding” as citizens of the state. Id. at 215. Aliens could attain citizen status
by public oath or affirmation. Id.
111
Id. at 215–16.
112
See Start, supra note 96, at 325 (“The colonists in attempting naturalization drew
from their English models. Denization was the first form adopted in the colonies, the
letters patent being issued by the governor, under the mistaken opinion that such
power was his as the King’s deputy. It is found in New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
and continued until its prohibition at the end of the seventeenth century. The cost of
denization was greater than other forms of naturalization. Lord Bellemont complained in 1699 that he could obtain but 12 shillings for his denizations, while his
predecessor in New York, Governor Fletcher, received £10 for himself and £5 for the
attorney general. Fees for naturalization in general ranged from 2 to 50 shillings.”).
113
See Kettner, supra note 63, at 110.
107
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Confederation were ratified in 1781, the “free inhabitants” of every
state (aside from paupers and vagabonds) were entitled to move
freely throughout the United States and to enjoy the “privileges
and immunities” of free citizens in the several states.114 No less a
figure than James Madison found the confusion of language in this
provision remarkable. It effectively permitted an alien to seek
naturalization in a state with permissive naturalization practices
and then move to a state with tighter restrictions, and still be entitled to all the incumbent rights of naturalized citizens in the second
state.115 But whatever privileges newly admitted citizens and denizens might claim under this provision, which included civil rights
but perhaps not full political rights, there was little doubt that foreigners might tend to choose the state with the most liberal admis-

114

The Articles of Confederation provided that:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among
the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of
these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States;
and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any
other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce,
subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants
thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to
prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State of
which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction, shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them.
Articles of Confederation art. IV. There was no provision in the Articles dealing with
naturalization, thus leaving regulation of the matter to the states.
115
The Federalist No. 42, at 285–86 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(“[T]hose who come under the denomination of free inhabitants of a State, although
not citizens of such State, are entitled in every other State to all the privileges of free
citizens of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than they may be entitled to in their
own State; so that it may be in the power of a particular State, or rather every State is
laid under a necessity, not only to confer the rights of citizenship in other States upon
any whom it may admit to such rights within itself; but upon any whom it may allow
to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction. . . . The very improper power would still
be retained by each State, of naturalizing aliens in every other State. In one State
residence for a short term confers all the rights of citizenship. In another qualifications of greater importance are required. An alien therefore legally incapacitated for
certain rights in the latter, may by previous residence only in the former, elude his incapacity; and thus the law of one State, be preposterously rendered paramount to the
law of another, within the jurisdiction of the other.”).
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sion policy and then move to another state after establishing a form
of legal status.116
The combined effect of competition among states and interstate
mobility created a sort of de facto national citizenship that laid the
foundation for a national constitutional standard. As early as 1782,
James Madison argued for the creation of a uniform rule of naturalization. Charles Pinckney (from the restrictive state of South
Carolina) made a similar argument at the Philadelphia Convention,
noting that “[t]he younger States will hold out every temptation to
foreigners, by making the admission to office less difficult in their
Governments, than the older,” and that “a foreigner, as soon as he
is admitted to the rights of citizenship in one, becomes entitled to
them in all.”117 Because “in some States, the residence which will
enable a foreigner to hold any office, will not in others intitle him
to a vote,” the only way to “render this power generally useful [is
to place it] in the Union, where alone it can be equally exercised.”118
Widespread acceptance of the argument for a national standard
made the transfer of naturalization power to the new federal government one of the least controversial features of the new Constitution.119
II. FRAMING THE CONSTITUTION’S NATURALIZATION CLAUSE
Perhaps as a result of the lack of controversy over the proper locus of naturalization authority, the debates at the Philadelphia
Convention provide little direct insight into the meaning of the
naturalization clause. The provision did not appear in the Virginia
Plan, and so did not occasion any debate in the early days of the
Convention, when the delegates acted through the Committee of
116

See Kettner, supra note 63, at 116–17 (recounting successful efforts of two prospective citizens to sidestep restrictive practices of Rhode Island by securing citizenship in New York and Massachusetts).
117
3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 120 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter Farrand].
118
Id. (emphasis added).
119
The principle of free movement of people has similarly produced pressure to
harmonize national asylum and immigration laws in the European Union. See Lauren
Gilbert, National Identity and Immigration Policy in the U.S. and the European Union, 14 Colum. J. Eur. L. 99, 119–26 (2007) (describing the push toward harmonization
in light of disparate approaches to immigration in Great Britain, France, and Germany).
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the Whole. Later, with the introduction of the New Jersey Plan on
June 15, 1787, naturalization made its first appearance in the formal record of the Convention in the form of a declaration that the
“rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every State.”120 The
Convention did not take any special notice of the provision at that
time but simply submitted it to the Committee of Detail in late July
along with the amended terms of the Virginia Plan. On August 6,
the naturalization clause as reported by the Committee of Detail
was approved by the delegates without controversy or recorded
debate.121 Moreover, it was included in the final text of the Constitution in virtually the same terms that the Committee of Detail had
proposed, with only minor adjustments by the Committee of
Style.122
If the debates and drafting history tell us little, we can nonetheless learn much from the text itself and from the assumptions that
influenced the drafting process. By empowering Congress to establish a uniform rule for naturalization throughout the United States,
the naturalization clause first carries an implication of relative
permanence: the uniform rule contemplated in the Constitution
was to be “establish[ed]” by Congress.123 To “establish” a single
uniform rule of naturalization was to put in place a relatively permanent system. Such an established system would not be fixed in
perpetuity, of course; Congress could alter the rules over time with
changes in circumstances. But an established system was one that
immigrants could depend upon in making the decision to come to
the United States. We propose to give content to this notion of
relative stability by viewing the “establish” requirement as creating
a norm of prospectivity: once established, the rule of naturalization
was to control until changed through prospective legislation.

120

1 Farrand, supra note 117, at 242, 245.
2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 182.
122
When the Committee of Style presented its report on September 12, 1787, the
naturalization and bankruptcy clauses were finally joined, granting Congress the
power “[t]o establish an uniform rule of naturalization and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.” Id. at 595; cf. id. at 569 (draft in
Committee of Detail).
123
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The use of the word “establish” marked an important
change from a previous draft, which sought to grant Congress the power to “regulate”
naturalization. See infra note 128.
121
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Along with this norm of relative permanence, Congress was authorized to establish a single “uniform rule” throughout the United
States.124 This demanding requirement of uniformity was meant to
displace the state-to-state variability that had characterized life under the Articles of Confederation.125 Under a uniform system, im124
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The Supreme Court has never engaged in an extensive
interpretation of the uniformity clause in the immigration context. See Iris Bennett,
Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of “Aggravated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1696, 1697–98 (1999). Early cases assumed that uniformity had similar meanings in both bankruptcy and naturalization,
and that such uniformity required only uniform application. Judith Schenck Koffler,
The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of
Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 22, 35–40 (1983). More recently, and in
response to scholars’ prodding, the Supreme Court has suggested that the naturalization clause demands a strict form of uniformity and leaves little room for state modification. See Bennett, supra, at 1705–20; cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382
(1971) (dictum) (“Congress’ power is to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.’
A congressional enactment construed so as to permit state legislatures to adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for federally supported welfare
programs would appear to contravene this explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity.”). Such arguments have arisen in relation to state regulation of welfare benefits for non-citizens and in relation to the definition of deportable offenses. Gilbert
Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the Galaxy
of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 591, 633–36 (1994) (arguing that Congress cannot incorporate state law into application of the naturalization power); Michael T.
Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization Power, 64 Geo. L.J. 1007, 1017–18 (1976). Two
lower court decisions dealing with uniformity in naturalization concluded that geographic uniformity was the Framers’ aim. See Kharaiti Ram Samras v. United States,
125 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1942) (holding that uniformity relates to geographic uniformity and not racial uniformity); Petition of Lee Wee, 143 F. Supp. 736, 738 (S.D.
Cal. 1956) (finding constitutional a statute which made a gambling offense proof
against good moral character for immigration purposes, even though the underlying
offense would not have been gambling in another city).
125
What little debate surrounded the naturalization clause tended to focus on the
need for an end to state-to-state disparity in naturalization procedures. James Madison, in an unpublished draft written toward the end of his life, recalled the “defects,
the deformities, the diseases and the ominous prospects, for which the Convention
were [sic] to provide a remedy.” 3 Farrand, supra note 117, at 549. One such “defect[]
which had been severely felt” was “that of a uniformity in cases requiring it, as laws of
naturalization, bankruptcy, a Coercive authority opperating [sic] on individuals and a
guaranty of the internal tranquility of the States.” Id. at 548. Madison issued a similar
call for uniformity in a letter written to Edmund Randolph in 1782: “the intrusion of
obnoxious aliens through other States, merit[s] attention. [This] subject has, on several occasions, been mentioned in Congress, but, I believe, no committee has ever reported a remedy for the abuse. A uniform rule of naturalization ought certainly to be
recommended to the States.” Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph
(Aug. 27, 1782), in 1 The Writings of James Madison 226–27 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1900), cited in Hertz, supra note 124, at 1009.
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migrants would confront the same requirements for citizenship no
matter where they settled in the United States. Such uniformity
would limit state competition for new immigrants and would prevent immigrants from seeking citizenship under one state’s regime
and then transferring their newly acquired citizenship to another
state under the privileges and immunities clause. More subtly, the
rule of uniformity would necessarily extend beyond formal citizenship to reach those awaiting naturalization as denizens (or what we
would today call “lawful permanent residents”).
Two important structural implications follow from the demand
for a uniform rule of naturalization and denization. First, from a
federalism perspective, the demand for a uniform rule eliminates
the states’ role in prescribing the rules that govern naturalization.
Uniformity can be achieved only through the specification of rules
at the national level, although the system may tolerate some incorporation of state law by reference. Second, the requirement of an
established and uniform rule imposes important limitations on the
manner in which Congress regulates naturalization. Uniformity
rules out the use of private bills, which were understood to admit
aliens to citizenship on a case-by-case basis. Such private legislation not only produced unacceptable variation in the terms of naturalization but also made naturalization more expensive, more elitist, and more prone to corruption.
A variety of evidence supports this understanding of the requirement that Congress establish a uniform rule for naturalization. As for the claim that the word “establish” conveys a distinctive message of relative permanence and prospectivity, the
Constitution itself supplies confirmation. The Constitution uses the
word “establish” rather sparingly, and in contexts that suggest not
absolute inflexibility but relative permanence. The preamble proposes to “ordain and establish” the Constitution, and thus to put in
place a government structure based on higher law that was immune
from change except through the process of amendment. One goal
of the preamble, “to establish Justice,” also conveys a message of
relative permanence; it connects to Congress’s power in Article III
to “ordain and establish” a system of lower federal courts that have
been a permanent part of the government since their “establish[ment]” in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Like these grants of
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power, Congress’s power to establish a system of naturalization
suggests a degree of permanence.126
The papers of the Committee of Detail confirm the significance
of the Framers’ decision to require Congress to establish a uniform
rule. An early draft places the naturalization power in Article I,
empowering Congress “to regulate naturalization.”127 A later draft
returns to the language of the New Jersey Plan, specifying that “the
Rule for Naturalization ought to be the same in every State.”128 A
final draft returns the clause to its eventual place in Article I, empowering Congress “to establish an uniform Rule for Naturalization
throughout the United States.”129 We can thus see the clause evolving in Committee from an initial grant of relatively unbridled
power to Congress, to a provision focused on inter-state comity,
and finally to a provision that ultimately both empowers and constrains Congress. The drafting history nicely contrasts the early
grant of plenary power to regulate naturalization and the more
constrained power conferred in the final text.
Debates over qualifications for election to the House and Senate
provide important insights into the Framers’ view of prospectivity
126
The Framers’ choice of the term “establish” to define and limit congressional
power was not inadvertent, but reflected a rejection of an early draft that would have
empowered Congress more broadly to “regulate” naturalization. See infra note 129
and accompanying text. Other power grants in Article I have been framed to confer
broad power on Congress. Congress’s seemingly unbridled power to “lay and collect
taxes” has been regarded as quite broad, empowering Congress to impose taxes on
transactions and events that have already occurred. Similarly, Congress’s power to
“make rules” for the government of the military, to “regulate” commerce, and to
“make all laws” under the necessary and proper clause convey broad power.
127
2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 144 (Committee of Detail, IV). See generally Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce
Power, 91 Va. L. Rev. 249, 263–84 (2005). In his article, Professor Colby argues that
“uniform” encompasses both “uniform rules” and “uniform treatment.” Uniform
rules “signify a single set of regulations that are generally applicable nationwide, in
service of the goal of economic efficiency” or, more or less, “uniform laws.” Id. at 263.
In contrast, uniform treatment implies a system that is applied equally and fairly. Id.
at 264.
128
2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 158 (Committee of Detail, VII); see id. at 157 n.15
(noting that this draft’s language was likely taken from the New Jersey Plan).
129
Id. at 167 (Committee of Detail, IX); see id. at 163 n.17 (language “to establish an
uniform Rule for Naturalization throughout the United States” was an addition by
Wilson). Wilson’s role in crafting the language that limited Congress’s authority bears
notice, both in light of his Scottish origins and in light of the views he expressed on
the need for prospectivity in the debate over qualifications for national office. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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as an essential element in the establishment of a system of naturalization.130 The issue arose in connection with the consideration of a
proposal to require citizenship for a minimum of seven years as a
condition of election to the House of Representatives.131 The proposal would disqualify newly-naturalized citizens, including those
who had not been subject to any such disability at the time of their
admission to citizenship.132 The disqualification was relatively mild;
naturalized citizens would qualify as soon as the seven-year period
had passed.133 Still, delegates to the Convention reminded one another that the nation had invited new immigrants to join the community with an unqualified promise of citizenship; to impose a
qualification now that would degrade them to the status of secondclass citizens (if only for a specified period of time) would breach
the public faith, and would impose an improperly retroactive
change in the naturalization system.134 Roger Sherman, a delegate
from Connecticut, rejected this breach of faith claim; he argued
that the United States might establish rules for the future that differed from the rules (and promises) that the states had made in the
past.135 Sherman did not deny that a retrospective change in the
rules was problematic; instead, he argued that as a new polity the

130

Those debates began with a motion by Gouverneur Morris to require senators to
have been citizens for at least fourteen years, a period long enough to have disqualified all foreigners naturalized since the Declaration of Independence. Id. at 235.
Madison, Franklin, Wilson, and others decried Morris’s approach as injecting “illiberality” into the Constitution. Id. at 235–37.
Interestingly, Britain had acted in 1773 to extend full political rights to those naturalized under the Act of 1740. These rights included the right to take any “Office or
Place of Trust, either Civil or Military” and to take “any Grant of Lands, Tenements,
and Hereditaments.” Kettner, supra note 63, at 77.
131
2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 268.
132
Morris started the debate over retroactivity by proposing a proviso that would
have made it clear that the disqualification of recently naturalized citizens would not
apply to anyone who had been naturalized when the Constitution took effect. Id. at
270. According to another Convention attendee, “[i]t was necessary . . . to prevent a
disfranchisement of persons who had become Citizens under the faith (& according
to)—the laws & Constitution (from) being on a level in all respects with natives.” Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 270–71.
135
Id. at 270 (“The U. States have not invited foreigners nor pledged their faith that
they should enjoy equal privileges with native Citizens. The Individual States alone
have done this. The former therefore are at liberty to make any discriminations they
may judge requisite.”).
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United States was not necessarily bound by the promises of its constituent members.136
Sherman’s contention triggered a defense of the principle of prospective lawmaking and an exploration of the nature of the public
faith as it applied to the states and the nation. Nathaniel Ghorum
of Massachusetts simply “doubted . . . the propriety of giving a retrospective force to the restriction.”137 Madison offered a more subtle contention, which rested on the notion that the states could not
rid themselves of their obligations under prior acts of naturalization by “repealing the law under which foreigners held their privileges.”138 This strong affirmation of the norm of prospectivity laid
the foundation for the rest of Madison’s contention: lacking power
to repeal their laws, the states should not shed the obligations
owed to citizens they previously naturalized by imposing retroactive restrictions through the Constitution.139 Madison thus viewed
prospective lawmaking as an essential element of the naturalization power. James Wilson, himself a citizen of Pennsylvania who
had emigrated from Scotland, also regarded a retrospective change
as a breach of public faith. He pointed both to the naturalization
laws of Pennsylvania and to the Articles of Confederation in contending that Pennsylvania had pledged to her citizens of foreign
birth “all the rights whatsoever of Citizens,” including citizenship
in all the states.140 Others joined the chorus against retroactive restrictions on rights of naturalized citizens, although some still cautioned against a rule that would admit foreigners too readily into
the nation’s public councils.141
In the end, by a narrow vote of 5-6, the Convention rejected the
proposal to exempt previously naturalized citizens from the sevenyear citizenship requirement for election to the House of Representatives.142 But the vote should not be read as rejecting prospectivity as an appropriate feature of the nation’s immigration policy.
For one thing, the delegates were later to adopt a regime of

136

Id.
Id.
138
Id. at 270–71.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 272.
141
Id. at 271–72 (George Mason (Virginia)).
142
Id. at 270–72.
137

PFANDER _WARDON_PREPP

392

3/18/2010 12:47 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 96:359

prospectivity in defining qualifications for the office of the presidency.143 Thus, naturalized citizens at the time of the Constitution’s
adoption were eligible to the presidency on the same footing with
natural-born citizens, even though the Constitution disqualified
citizens naturalized in the future.144 The provision makes sense only
as a bow to arguments for prospectivity. For another thing, the
states that voted against the House qualifications motion (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia) were those with the most restrictive immigration
laws.145 One member of a restrictive state delegation, Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina,146 explained the logic of his state’s
negative vote because the “laws of the States had varied much the
terms of naturalization in different parts of America . . . the U.S.
could not be bound to respect them on [this] occasion.”147 Despite
widespread support for honoring the interests of new citizens,
Pinckney argued that the lack of uniformity among the states
would prevent any citizen naturalized under the Articles of Confederation from legitimately expecting full political rights throughout the country.
Pinckney’s argument highlights the connection between uniformity and prospectivity in defining the operation of the naturalization clause. If the lack of uniformity in the past might justify a
degree of retroactivity in defining qualifications for members of the
House, such arguments would carry little force as a justification for
143

See id. at 536.
The presidential qualification requirement declares that no person shall be eligible to the office of the President, except for “a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of
the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution.” U.S. Const. art.
II, § 1, cl. 5. Thus, while citizens naturalized after the Constitution took effect were
excluded from the highest office, those whose naturalization had taken effect before
its adoption were eligible. This provided the very prospectivity that the Convention
had rejected in connection with the qualifications for membership in the House. In
addition, the fourteen-year residency requirement was framed, like the age requirement, to apply to all candidates, including both natural-born and naturalized citizens.
Somewhat curiously, in light of the debate over the qualifications of the House and
Senate, the presidential qualification provision was adopted without recorded debate
or controversy. See 2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 536.
145
2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 272.
146
As we have seen, South Carolina took the position that a private bill was necessary to admit naturalized citizens to the full rights of political participation in that
state. See Kettner, supra note 63, at 86.
147
2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 271.
144
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retrospective lawmaking under the new Constitution. The whole
point of the naturalization clause was to eliminate state-to-state
variation and to encourage Congress to fashion a single uniform
rule throughout the country.148 Thus, the two elements of the naturalization clause—the uniformity requirement and the requirement
that Congress establish a relatively stable system of naturalization—operate in tandem to ensure a measure of respect for the reliance interests of those seeking citizenship. Pinckney, and the
delegates who found his argument persuasive, were not so much
rejecting prospectivity as suggesting that it await the creation of a
nationally uniform system under the new Constitution.149
III. NATURALIZATION POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC
If the Framers of the Constitution subscribed to norms of uniformity and prospectivity in naturalization law, members of Congress studiously adhered to these norms during the Federalist era.
This Part reviews the legislative debates that led to the adoption of
the naturalization laws of 1790, 1795, and 1798. As we show, members of Congress were careful to observe norms of prospectivity
and refused, apparently on constitutional grounds, to take action
on petitions for favorable private naturalization laws. Equally revealing, they regarded the formation of naturalization rules as tantamount to the construction of an immigration policy for the new
nation.
A. The Naturalization Act of 1790 and the Refusal of Congress to
Proceed by Private Bill
Acting “to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,”150 Congress adopted legislation in 1790 that imposed a limited set of
qualifications for admission to citizenship. Aliens were eligible for
citizenship if they were “free white person[s]” who “shall have resided” for at least two years “within the limits and under the juris-

148

See id. at 235.
For the suggestion that relatively uniform and stable rules have a stronger claim
to immunity from retroactive changes, see Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal
Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1105–06 (1997).
150
1790 Act, supra note 34, at 103.
149
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diction of the United States.”151 Aliens were also required to show
good character and to promise, by oath or affirmation, to support
the Constitution.152 The proceedings on the alien’s application were
to be held in “any common law court of record, in any one of the
states wherein he shall have resided for the term of one year at
least.”153 Contrary to some accounts,154 this formulation apparently
empowered both state and federal courts to entertain naturalization petitions.155 Finally, the Act provided that “the clerk of such
court shall record such application, and the proceedings
thereon.”156 From that point, the person was to “be considered as a
citizen of the United States.”157
This provision followed its British predecessor in specifying a
uniform rule of naturalization for administration by common law
courts of record.158 The Act made citizenship uniformly available
throughout the United States on relatively generous terms, at least
for free white persons, and ensured the creation of a record to
memorialize the new status. In contrast to the seven-year residency
required in Parliament’s Act of 1740 and in some state provisions,
the Act of 1790 required only two years’ residence in the country
151

Id.
Id.
153
Id.
154
See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 576 (1926) (dating the performance of
the function of naturalization by the federal district courts to the “Act of January 29,
1795” rather than to the 1790 Act); cf. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress:
The Federalist Period, 1789–1801, at 90 (1997) (noting that the 1790 Act did not specify that federal courts were to hear naturalization petitions, did not confer jurisdiction
on them to do so, and would present Article III difficulties to the extent that it
enlisted the federal courts in ex parte proceedings).
155
The minute book of the federal district court in New York, for example, includes
naturalization entries that date from shortly after the 1790 Act took effect. See Minutes and Rolls of Attorneys of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York, 1789–1841, Roll 1, Target 1, Slide 36 (Nov. 2, 1790), microformed on Nat’l
Archives of the United States, M886 (Nat’l Archives Microfilm Publ’n) (recording the
conclusion of Judge James Duane that one Philip Dubey had resided in the United
States for two years and in New York City for at least one year and was “a person of
good character” and was entitled to take the oath for admission to citizenship, which
“was administered to the said Philip Dubey accordingly”). By giving Dubey credit for
periods of residence that pre-dated the passage of the 1790 Act, the court gave the
statute the prospective effect that its drafters apparently contemplated. See infra note
196.
156
1790 Act, supra note 34, at 103–04.
157
Id. at 104.
158
See Kettner, supra note 63, at 74.
152

PFANDER _WARDON_PREPP

2010]

Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution

3/18/2010 12:47 PM

395

and one year’s residence in the state in which application for citizenship was made.159 By placing the determinations in courts of record, moreover, the Act ruled out any private role for legislative
assemblies, with one minor and quite revealing exception.160 The
Act provided that aliens previously “proscribed” by act of the state
assembly could not apply for citizenship under the national system
until they first secured a reversal of their proscription.161 One can
understand this proviso as a limited accommodation of the norm of
prospectivity: individuals that the state assemblies had banished for
disloyalty during the Revolution could not reclaim their citizenship
until the state banishment was overturned. Apart from this role in

159
Compare An Act for Naturalizing Such Foreign Protestants, and Others Therein
Mentioned, as Are Settled, or Shall Settle, in Any of His Majesty’s Colonies in America, 1740, 13 Geo. II, c. 7 (Eng.), with 1790 Act, supra note 34.
160
The process of admission to citizenship entailed a genuine review of the record
and could result in a denial of the petition. This is illustrated by the denial of Peter
Vauttes’s citizenship petition:
At a special District Court of the United States held for the New York District at the City of New York on Tuesday the Fifteenth Day of January 1799 at
11 O’Clock
PRESENT
The Honorable John Hobart Esquire
Judge of the District
The Court was opened by Proclamation
Joseph King at present of the City of New York but late of Great Britain
Shoe manufacturer age thirty-eight years and John Dawson at present of the
same City and late of Great Brian wine and Peter Vauttes aged twenty seven
years severally came into court and applied to be admitted to become Citizens
of the United States of America pursuant to the Directions of the acts of Congress of the said United States entitled “An Act to establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization and to repeal the Act heretofore passed on that Subject” and
said Joseph King, and John Dawson having thereupon severally produced to
the Court such evidence and made such Declaration and Renunciation by the
said Act is required.
It is considered by the Court that the said Joseph King and John Dawson be
and they are hereby respectively admitted to be Citizens of the United States of
America.
Minutes and Rolls of Attorneys of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, 1789-1841, Roll 1, Target 3, Slide 21 (Jan. 15, 1799), microformed on Nat’l Archives of the United States, M866 (Nat’l Archives Microfilm
Publ’n).
161
1790 Act, supra note 34, at 104. The Act referred to state legislative measures
adopted during the Revolutionary War that proclaimed the disloyalty of certain persons, named in the acts, and provided for the confiscation of their property.
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removing previous state proscriptions, however, state assemblies
were excluded from the naturalization process.162
Debates leading up to the adoption of the first naturalization bill
reveal much about the perceived connection between naturalization, land ownership, and immigration policy. Representative
Laurance (New York) summarized these connected ideas well:
“The reason of admitting foreigners to the rights of citizenship
amongst us, is, the encouragement of emigration, as we have a
large tract of country to people.”163 Like his colleagues, Laurance
assumed that only citizens could own land and that, by defining the
right to acquire citizenship, Congress would effectively be establishing an immigration policy for the new nation. The recognized
link between immigration and the land did not settle every question. Members debated how long a residency period to require and
whether to establish gradations of citizenship that would admit
aliens to progressively greater privileges over time. In other words,
members sought to calibrate citizenship requirements with a view
toward attracting “worthy” immigration. But nothing suggested
that the essential identity between rules of naturalization and rules
of immigration was questioned by the Framers.
James Madison recognized the connection in urging a middle
way on immigration matters. The goal of the naturalization rule
162
However, there remained confusion over the states’ role in naturalization. “What
the discussions and act of 1790 did not clarify was whether Congress’s control over
naturalization was now to be exclusive or whether it was merely to supplement state
acts.” Kettner, supra note 63, at 238–39. The statute “did nothing to settle questions
respecting the spheres of authority of the state and national governments, and many
states continued to administer their own naturalization laws.” Id. at 239. As Kettner
explains:
It was the considered opinion of the judges of the federal circuit court of Pennsylvania that the Constitution’s clause was designed “to guard against too narrow, instead of too liberal, a mode of conferring the rights of citizenship.” The
individual states could not exclude those adopted by the United States, but they
could adopt citizens on easier terms that those which Congress “may deem it
expedient to impose.”
Id. (quoting Collett v. Collett, 2. U.S. (2 Dall.) 294, 296 (C.C.D. Pa. 1792)). That confusion has since been resolved. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410,
419 (1948) (holding that states “can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens”).
163
Cong. Reg. (Feb. 3, 1790) (remarks of Rep. Laurance (New York)), reprinted in
12 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of America: Debates in the House of Representatives 148 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1994)
[hereinafter 12 DHFFC].
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was to “hold out as many inducements as possible, for the worthy
part of mankind to come and settle amongst us.”164 The aim was
“[n]ot merely to swell the catalogue of people [but] to [i]ncrease
the wealth and strength of the community.”165 It was not enough
that aliens take an oath to reside in the country, as an early draft of
the legislation had proposed.166 Rather, it was necessary to “require
residence as an essential.”167 This would help to ensure that everyone who gained the privilege of citizenship would be “a real addition to the wealth or strength of the United States.”168 Madison
worried in particular about the possibility of absentee landowners,
those who might take the oath and gain citizenship but later “return to the country from which they came.” An actual residence
requirement would reduce the anti-republican threat of absentee
landlords, like the large landowners in Ireland who had chosen to
live in England.169
Just as the drafters of the bill sought to foreclose absentee landownership through a somewhat more demanding residency requirement, they also worried about welcoming the impoverished
and insecure. By limiting naturalization to “free” persons, the Act
164

Id. (remarks of Rep. Madison (Virginia)).
Id.
166
The initial draft would have provided rights of citizenship for those who gave
oaths of allegiance to, and of residence in, the United States, and who had actually
resided in the country for one year. The draft went on to declare that naturalized citizens would gain the additional right to hold office under the state or general government after a residence of two additional years. See id. at 146. The draft was controversial for its relatively short terms of residence, its progressive definition of the rights
of citizens, and its treatment of the right of naturalized citizens to hold office, particularly at the state level.
167
Id. at 149.
168
Id.
169
This was no mere hypothetical possibility. In January 1790, just before debating
the naturalization law, the House considered a petition from one H.W. Dobbyn, an
Irish landowner, who sought a land grant of 50,000 acres and citizenship in the United
States. See infra notes 179–82 and accompanying text. Dobbyn planned to sell the
land to his tenant farmers, relocating them from Ireland to the frontier. Madison may
have seen Dobbyn as an absentee landlord in the making. During debate on the petition, Roger Sherman wanted to know if the petitioner “intended coming here to settle.” 12 DHFFC, supra note 163, at 49. Later in the debate over the naturalization
law, one member argued that absentee ownership might deserve consideration if only
to facilitate foreign investment secured by mortgages on land in the United States.
See id. at 164 (remarks of Rep. Clymer (Pennsylvania)). But see id. at 165 (remarks of
Rep. Jackson (Georgia)) (arguing that allegiance and land ownership go together and
opposing Clymer’s notion of absentee ownership).
165
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precluded indentured servants from gaining admission to citizenship. Obviously, this barrier to citizenship would end with the expiration of the term of indentured servitude set forth in the contract,
often a period of four to five years (or with freedom in the case of
slaves). By then, the former servant would have satisfied the residency requirement and would qualify for admission to citizenship.
Some members of the House also wished to avoid extending an invitation to “the common class of vagrants, paupers, and other outcasts of Europe.”170 To strike the proper balance, the applicant for
citizenship should spend time on probation and then “bring testi171
monials of a proper and decent behaviour.” If such a rule dissuaded “bad men” from immigrating, so be it; the nation would be
better off “keep[ing them] out of the country, than admit[ting]
them into it.”172 In contrast to those who demanded good behavior,
others favored easy terms of naturalization “in order to people our
country”; these supporters of easy admission believed that criminal
laws would suffice “to restrain and regulate the conduct of an individual.”173 Although they differed on the particulars, in short,
members of the House agreed that whatever rule of naturalization
they adopted would operate in effect as a rule of immigration.
Two other features of the law deserve notice. First, unlike its
English precursor, it contains no religious test for admission to citizenship; as Representative Page (Virginia) explained, “[i]t is nothing to us, whether Jews, or Roman Catholics, settle amongst us; . . .
neither their religious [nor their] political opinions can injure us.”174
Members of the First Congress not only excluded state assemblies
from the naturalization process, but they also viewed themselves as
having little role to play once the law was in place. For the first
several decades of its existence, Congress refrained from adopting

170
Id. at 151 (remarks of Rep. Jackson (Georgia)); see also id. at 155 (remarks of
Rep. Burke (South Carolina)) (expressing a desire to interdict the “convicts and
criminals which they pour out of British jails”); id. at 147 (remarks of Rep. Sherman
(Connecticut)) (expressing concern with emigrants who were likely to become
“chargeable,” or impoverished).
171
Id. at 151 (remarks of Rep. Jackson (Georgia)).
172
Id. at 151–52 (remarks of Rep. Jackson (Georgia)).
173
Id. at 153 (remarks of Rep. Laurance (New York)).
174
Id. at 147.
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private naturalization bills.175 This absence of congressional involvement did not reflect a blanket refusal to adopt private legislation; indeed, private bills were a routine fact of life in the early
years of the Republic.176 Congress handled an enormous range of
such legislation in other areas, passing on such matters as claims
for losses suffered during the Revolutionary War, claims by disabled veterans for pensions, and claims for losses associated with
invasions of property rights or breaches of public faith.177 But strikingly, none of these early private bills operated to confer citizenship on an alien.178
What accounts for the failure of Congress to adopt private naturalization bills? The evidence suggests that members viewed the
Constitution as foreclosing that form of naturalization.179 One can
see this posture reflected in a variety of actions taken by Congress
175
See generally Maguire, supra note 37. Indeed, John Quincy Adams publicly declared that private bill practice was incompatible with separation of powers principles.
Id. at 1. Of the nine private bills in the First Congress, none dealt with naturalization.
Id. at 1, 10.
176
Id.; see infra note 177.
177
See William C. diGiancomantonio, Petitioners and Their Grievances: A View
from the First Congress, in The House and Senate in the 1790s: Petitioning, Lobbying,
and Institutional Development 29, 47 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon
eds., 2002) (noting that the “overwhelming majority” of petitions in the First Congress were “direct by-products of the War for Independence”); see also James E.
Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and
Government Accountability in the Early Republic (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/faculty-workshops/faculty-workshops.html
(describing the use of private legislation to indemnify government officers held liable
in tort for trespassory wrongs); Don L. Smith, The Right to Petition for Redress of
Grievances: Constitutional Development and Interpretations 81–83, 109–12 (1971)
(unpublished dissertation, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
178
It was not until 1839, fifty years after the first public naturalization act, that Congress adopted its first private naturalization bill. Maguire, supra note 37, at 10, app.
D1, at 261. Even so, the private bill did not in terms confer citizenship on the petitioner, but provided him with relief from a time bar that would have otherwise prevented the district court of Maryland from updating the 1804 record of his naturalization to correct its statement of his name. See An Act for the relief of Dr. John
Campbell White, of Baltimore, in the state of Maryland, ch. 23, 6 Stat. 750, 750–51
(1839).
179
Private bills were certainly under consideration, both in connection with the
Dobbyn petition, and in comments from Rep. Huntington (Connecticut), who reminded his colleagues that no person in his state can be naturalized “but by an act of
the legislature.” 12 DHFFC, supra note 163, at 158. Although Huntington invited the
House to leave the naturalization of foreigners to state legislatures, no one took the
suggestion seriously.
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in its early years. For starters, the First Congress considered a petition from one H.W. Dobbyn, an Irish landlord, who sought a grant
of 50,000 acres of land from the public domain and the right to sell
the land to his former tenants.180 The House tabled the petition after hearing from members that naturalization and land sales ought
to be governed by general laws. Thus, Representative Smith (South
Carolina) explained that
The applicant was avowedly an alien; now, by the laws of this
country, it was generally understood, that an alien cannot hold
real estate; they may hold it as trustees, [but it would be a mistake] to encourage or countenance the holding of land by such a
tenure. It ought also to be considered, that a committee is appointed who will probably report in a short time, the plan of uniform naturalization; now it would be impossible for the house at
this time to judge whether an alien, holding lands in America,
181
would be able to conform in all respects to such a law.

A member of the House responded by suggesting that the House
could overcome the difficulty by inserting a provision about citizenship in the bill, but Representative Stone (Maryland) rejected
the idea. It was simply not “proper, in his opinion, to make a naturalization act to apply to an individual.”182
Members of the House returned to this theme in debates over
changes to the naturalization law in 1795. Adopted late in Washington’s second term, while Chief Justice Jay was negotiating the
treaty that bears his name and the United States was struggling to
maintain neutrality in the face of European convulsions,183 the Act
of 1795 primarily operated to lengthen the required term of resi180
See 8 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of
America 196–98 (Kenneth R. Bowling et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter 8 DHFFC] (reporting that Dobbyn had sold his estate in Ireland and wished to settle in America
“with a large body of his former tenants”). For the discussion of Dobbyn’s petition,
see The Daily Advertiser (Jan. 21, 1790), reprinted in 12 DHFFC, supra note 163, at
40.
181
See Cong. Reg. (Jan. 20, 1790), reprinted in 12 DHFFC, supra note 163, at 49.
182
Id.
183
See Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, at 388–431 (1993) (describing the British attack on Americans who were trading with French interests, the growing rancor towards Great Britain in 1794, the controversial terms of Jay’s treaty, and the treaty’s eventual
ratification).
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dence from two to five years and tighten the oath requirement. In
the course of debates, members of the House considered how to
treat those who had expatriated themselves from the United States
and now sought to reclaim their citizenship. Following the approach of the Act of 1790, Representative Giles recommended that
expatriates be required to obtain a special act of state legislature to
obtain reinstatement. Representative Tracy (Connecticut) worried
that such an approach would make repatriation too easy; he proposed requiring expatriates to obtain a private bill from Congress
as well.184
Although the Annals of Congress do not record the ensuing debate in detail, it appears that members raised constitutional objections to the proposed reliance on private legislation:
[Representative Tracy’s] motion was afterwards considered in
several points of view, as blending State and Continental legislation, as interfering with the Legislative rights of the State by
some, and as operating in the same manner in respect to the right
reserved by the Constitution to the General Government, which
185
is authorized to pass uniform laws of naturalization by others.

One can see a variety of concerns reflected in this summary: concerns grounded in federalism and the need to protect the role of
State legislatures as well as concerns based on the prospect that
state legislation would interfere with the paramount role of the
general government. Critics apparently questioned as well the suggested reliance on private legislation as inconsistent with the requirement of a uniform law.186
Comments of John Quincy Adams at roughly the same time suggest that doubts about the constitutionality of legislative acts of
naturalization were entertained both in and out of Congress.
Commenting on a proposed treaty that would have given the citizens and subjects of the United States and England reciprocal exemptions from all disabilities of alienage, Adams recognized that
184

See 4 Annals of Cong. 1005 (1794).
Id.
186
See Frank George Franklin, The Legislative History of Naturalization in the
United States 51 (1906) (noting that Tracy withdrew his motion, after constitutional
objections were raised, and noting that his proposal “[c]ertainly . . . conflicted with the
constitutional requirement of uniformity”).
185
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such an arrangement would encourage trade and commerce but
might be difficult to put in place. Adams indicated that such a proposal would require an act of Parliament and would face a “more
material obstacle” grounded in the Constitution.187 Adams was apparently referring to the naturalization clause and its requirement
of uniformity; indeed, he later raised constitutional objections to
the Louisiana Purchase on the ground that “[i]t naturalizes foreign
nations in a mass.”188 Adams’s concern offers important insights
into early Republic thinking about the role of the legislature in
naturalization proceedings. First, and most obviously, it suggests
that Congress was limited to the adoption of public laws of general
applicability and could not selectively naturalize aliens, either
alone or in a group. Second, and more subtle, Adams obviously believed that the power of Congress to confer status short of full citizenship was encompassed within the naturalization clause and
regulated by its uniformity requirement. Neither the English proposal nor the treaty underlying the Louisiana Purchase would confer formal citizenship but Adams viewed both of the lesser forms of
status as controlled by the Constitution’s uniformity rule.
Having apparently concluded that the Constitution barred private bills relating to citizenship, Congress acted to address instances of perceived unfairness through the adoption of curative
statutes that applied to everyone in the relevant class. Consider a
telling piece of curative legislation, adopted in 1804.189 The legislation first responded to the problem of those who were residing in
the United States between 1798 and 1802, at a time when Congress
required a declaration of intent five years prior to their application
for citizenship.190 This five-year declaration rule would have delayed admission to citizenship for some aliens who were otherwise
qualified under the five-year residency and three-year declaration
rules of the Act of 1802.191 Congress addressed the problem by sim187

Id. at 9 (quoting Adams’s diary).
Id. at 10 (quoting 5 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams 401 (Charles Francis Adams
ed., 1875)). The Louisiana Purchase required that former French citizens of New Orleans enjoy the same privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States, even
before Louisiana was admitted to statehood. See Pfander, supra note 14, at 712–14.
189
See Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 47, 2 Stat. 292 [hereinafter 1804 Act].
190
For a description of the law, see infra notes 191–93 and accompanying text.
191
See Franklin, supra note 186, at 110–15 (explaining that Congress passed the 1804
remedial legislation in order to address the frequent private naturalization petitions it
188
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ply eliminating the declaration requirement for the class of 1798–
1802.192 The legislation also responded to the problem of an alien
who, though qualified for citizenship, had died before taking the
oath that would have conferred formal citizenship status on him
and his wife and minor children. The Act of 1804 addressed the
problem by extending rights of citizenship to the widow and children of the deceased, provided they took “the oaths prescribed by
law.”193 In both instances, the Act sought to protect individuals
from the unfair application of existing law, but did so by adopting
rules of general application rather than special relief legislation.194
B. Early Congressional Adherence to the Norm of Prospectivity
Apart from its refusal to adopt private bills, Congress acted on
the principle that the Constitution required prospective legislation
in the field of naturalization law. Interestingly, the concern with
prospectivity arose during debates over the nation’s first naturalization act in 1790. One might assume that the legislation creating
the nation’s first system would not occasion such concerns. But recall that a number of aliens had been drawn to the United States by
the rules of naturalization that were in place in the states in which
they had taken up residence. Representative Smith (South Carolina) called attention to the issue: “What is to become of those inchoate rights of citizenship, which are not yet completed? Can the
Government, by an ex post facto law, deprive an alien of the advantage of such an inchoate right?”195
The Annals do not quote any direct answer to Smith’s query, although the Act was drafted to address the concern. First, the twoyear residency requirement in the federal law was framed to credit
aliens with any time they had spent as residents of the United
received from those people unduly burdened because they came to the United States
when the 1798 Act was in force).
192
1804 Act, supra note 189, at 292–93.
193
Id. at 293.
194
Congress’s refusal to adopt private naturalization bills continued well into the
nineteenth century. One Peter Jackson sought relief by petition, describing his arrival
in the United States as a minor child, his marriage to a U.S. citizen, his service in the
War of 1812, and his recent ejection from civil office on the basis that he was not a
citizen. The House Judiciary Committee considered his petition but resolved that it
should not be granted. For an account, see Franklin, supra note 186, at 169–70.
195
1 Annals of Cong. 1123 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
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States before the law took effect.196 By giving aliens credit for earlier periods of residency, the Act would lessen any retrospective effect. Second, by establishing a relatively short term of residency,
the law provided easier terms of admission than those in place in
many of the states, again moderating any retrospective effect.
Subsequent legislative practice during the early Republic helps
to cement our claim about the Framers’ commitment to prospective lawmaking. In January 1795, Congress adopted a second act to
establish a uniform rule of naturalization.197 The legislation came at
a time when the divisions between the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans, including spats over citizenship, had grown
sharper.198 Federalists spoke in terms of the importance of assuring
that new immigrants were properly attached to republican principles; their concern was made all the more urgent by their recognition that newly naturalized citizens were likely to vote for the Democratic-Republican party.199 The solution was to extend the
period of required residency from two to five years and to demand
a clearer oath or affirmation in support of the Constitution and a
clearer renunciation of any titles of nobility and lingering allegiance to their former country.200
Despite the decision to tighten the standards for admission to
citizenship, however, the drafters of the new legislation were careful to make these changes prospectively. Section 1 contained the
new five-year residency requirement.201 Section 2 declared that, for
immigrants residing in the United States on January 29, 1795 (the

196

The statute extended the privilege of citizenship to any alien “who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for a term of
two years.” 1790 Act, supra note 34. Had the Act referred to aliens who “shall reside”
in the United States, it might have been construed as giving aliens credit only for periods of residence that came after the Act’s effective date; by referring instead to
aliens who “shall have resided,” the Act gave aliens credit for pre-Act periods of residence.
197
See Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 [hereinafter 1795 Act].
198
See, e.g., Robert J. Steinfeld, Subjectship, Citizenship, and the Long History of
Immigration Regulation, 19 Law & Hist. Rev. 645, 648–49 (2001).
199
Id. See generally Douglas M. Bradburn, “True Americans” and “Hordes of Foreigners”: Nationalism, Ethnicity and the Problem of Citizenship in the United States,
1789–1800, 29 Hist. Reflections 19, 26 (2003) (explaining the Federalist worry “about
a flood of [French] revolutionaries”).
200
1795 Act, supra note 197, at 414.
201
Id.
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effective date of the Act), naturalization was to be available if they
had resided for two years in the country and one year in the state
of application.202 This was the same rule that had been established
in the 1790 Act.203 Similarly, the Act of 1795 included a new requirement, obliging candidates for citizenship to declare their intent to become citizens after three years’ residence.204 Yet again,
the provisions of Section 2 governing those already in the country
contained no such prior-declaration requirement.205 Congress thus
took care to maintain public faith not only with those who had
gained citizenship under the earlier law but also with those noncitizens who were residing in the United States in circumstances
that entitled them to claim the benefit of the 1790 standards. As
Nathan Dane explained in his popular abridgment, the provision
assured that if an alien were “resident in the United States when
this act was passed, he was admissible on the terms of the former
act.”206
Congress continued to adjust the rule for naturalization and,
with one important exception, honored its established practice of
making only prospective changes in the law. The exception occurred in 1798, at a time when hostilities with France led the Federalists to adopt a series of war measures over Jeffersonian objec202

Id. at 415.
See 1790 Act, supra note 34, at 103–04.
204
1795 Act, supra note 197, at 414. The record of James Pollock’s appearance before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York illustrates
the practical impact of the declaration requirement:
James Pollock now of the City of New York but late of ________ in the Kingdom of Ireland Merchant, aged forty eight years came in to Court and pursuant
to the direction of the act of Congress of the United States of America entitled
“an Act to Establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization and to Repeal the act
heretofore passed on that subject” made oath that it is Bona Fide his intention
to become a citizen of the United States and to Renounce forever all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign Prince, Potentate, Sate or Sovereign whatever and
particularly to the King of Great Britain to whom he is a subject.
Thereupon
It is ordered by the Court that the oath or affidavit to made by the said James
Pollock be subscribed by him and filed with the Clerk of the Court.
Minutes and Rolls of Attorneys of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, 1789–1841, Roll 1, Target 2, Slide 300 (August 1, 1798), microformed on Nat’l Archives of the United States, M866 (Nat’l Archives Microfilm
Publ’n).
205
1795 Act, supra note 197, at 415.
206
4 Nathan Dane, A General Abridgment and Digest of American Law 710 (1824).
203
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tions.207 As part of this package, the naturalization act of June 18,
1798 took a number of drastic steps. It limited naturalization to
those who had resided for fourteen years in the United States and
for five years in the state of application.208 It also required aliens
who wished to secure citizenship to make a declaration to that effect at least five years before applying for naturalization.209 Furthermore, the Act created a central record-keeping system by
obliging local courts to transmit a copy of naturalization records to
the Secretary of State.210 Finally, the Act required all aliens who either arrived, or continued to reside, in the country after the effective date of the Act to register as such with a federal officer.211
Those opposing the retroactive features of the law put forward
two arguments. The first, advanced by Representative Smith, was
squarely based on the Constitution:
To adopt the resolution as reported would be, he believed, to
agree upon an ex post facto regulation. It could not be intended,
he should suppose, to prevent persons who had resided in this
country two or three years, under the expectation of becoming
212
citizens at the end of five years, from that privilege.

In addition, members of the House appealed to fairness and a
sense of justice. Representative Gallatin (Pennsylvania) observed
that many aliens had sought naturalization under the terms of state
law, mistakenly assuming that such a mode remained lawful.213 He
207

See generally Steinfeld, supra note 198, at 648–49. On the quasi-war with France,
and the politics that produced the Alien and Sedition Acts, see Elkins & McKitrick,
supra note 183, at 590–93. On the connection between fears of French influence and
the naturalization law, see 8 Annals of Cong. 1453 (1798) (remarks of Rep. Sitgreaves
(Pennsylvania)) (noting the “number of French citizens in our country” and the real
possibility of war with France); see also Bradburn, supra note 199, at 28–29 (describing the Federalist effort to define more narrowly the concept of American citizenship).
208
See Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566, 566 [hereinafter 1798 Act].
209
Id.
210
Id. at 567.
211
Id. at 567–68.
212
8 Annals of Cong. 1569 (1798) (remarks of Rep. Smith (Maryland)). Smith’s remarks pre-dated Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), in which the Supreme
Court concluded that the prohibition against ex post facto laws applied only to those
that imposed retroactive criminal liability. Id. at 390–91.
213
See, e.g., Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 259–61 (1817) (recounting that
one John Chirac, a French citizen, first invoked the Maryland naturalization proce-
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argued against retroactive changes by urging Congress to give
aliens resident before the passage of the 1795 Act, and those who
had made the declaration required in 1795, a limited opportunity to
seek naturalization under its provisions.214 Representative Craik
(Maryland), although inclined to foreclose new immigration altogether, agreed that retrospective changes in the rules governing
resident aliens were “unjust.”215
The arguments of Reps. Smith, Gallatin, and Craik prevailed, resulting in a significant moderation of the retroactive features of the
law. For aliens who established residence before the 1795 Act became law, citizenship was to be available without a declaration
upon proof of five years’ residence; aliens were given one year to
take advantage of this saving clause.216 For those who established
residence in the United States after the effective date of the 1795
Act, and were entitled under those provisions to naturalization after five years’ residency and a proper declaration, the 1798 Act
permitted them to seek naturalization on the basis of five years’
residency for a period of four years from the date of their declaration.217 In both respects, then, even the relatively harsh terms of the
1798 Act were significantly moderated in response to arguments
that the Constitution permitted only prospective rule changes in
the naturalization arena. 218
dure in 1795 and then subsequently petitioned for naturalization under the laws of the
United States in July 1798, shortly after the restrictive naturalization law of that year
took effect).
214
Representative Gallatin argued that many aliens believed themselves to have
been lawfully naturalized, because they were naturalized under state laws (apparently
in contravention of norms of federal exclusivity). See 8 Annals of Cong. 1776–79
(1798). He found it unfair that such aliens would have “no opportunity” to become
naturalized under the proposed Act. Franklin, supra note 186, at 86. Accordingly,
“[h]e would give a limited period during which these might still have the benefit of the
existing law.” Id.
215
8 Annals of Cong. 1779 (1798) (Rep. Craik (Maryland)) (expressing the view that
the proposed retroactive operation of the law to bar resident aliens from securing
naturalized citizenship “would be very unjust” and agreeing with Gallatin that “a
large class of persons” had either failed as yet to seek naturalization or had mistakenly sought it under the laws of Maryland and Virginia); Franklin, supra note 186, at
87.
216
See 1798 Act, supra note 208, at 566–67.
217
Id.
218
To the extent that the 1798 Act retained a flavor of retroactivity, one might view
the provisions as the product of some political gamesmanship; the Federalists no
doubt recognized that many of the aliens whose citizenship was complicated by these
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Despite these moderating features, the 1798 Act was quickly
countermanded when the Jeffersonians took control of Congress.
The Act of April 14, 1802 repealed the 1798 provisions, and substituted a new regime that was to last, with minor adjustments, for the
remainder of the nineteenth century.219 Under the new rules, an
alien was required to reside in the United States for five years and
to reside in the state of application for one year.220 Moreover, the
alien was required to declare an intent to seek citizenship at least
three years prior to making an application for naturalization.221 Together, these two provisions returned the rules of naturalization to
those that had prevailed in 1795.222 Finally, aliens arriving after the
effective date of the act were required to register with a federal officer.223 By thus limiting the registration requirement to new arrivals, the Act made clear that those already residing in the United
States in 1802 owed no such obligation. In effect, then, by repealing
the prior law, the Act granted amnesty to all the individuals who

maneuvers would, if naturalized, have likely voted for the Democrat-Republicans in
the 1798 mid-term elections. See Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of
Citizenship in U.S. History 163 (1997) (arguing that Federalist nativism had driven
immigrant voters to Jefferson’s Republican Party). Jefferson shared the view that
naturalization policy was driven at least in part by political considerations. See Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry (May 18, 1797), reprinted in Letters and
Addresses of Thomas Jefferson 116 (William B. Parker & Jonas Viles eds., 1905) (arguing that the British were influencing American politics by securing naturalized citizenship, such that these “foreign and false citizens now constitute the great body of
what are called our merchants, fill our sea ports, are planted in every little town and
district of the interior country, sway everything in the former places by their own
votes, and those of their dependents”). One might also view this statutory provision as
a reflection of common law notions of the restricted rights of alien enemies during
wartime. See Neuman, Strangers, supra note 3, at 58 (noting that “Madison viewed as
fundamental the distinction between alien enemies and alien friends . . . [and] [a]s to
alien enemies, the Constitution’s grant of the war power gave Congress the usual authority under the law of nations”). Importantly, the Act applies to all applicants for
naturalized citizenship, not just to those from France. See 1798 Act, supra note 208, at
566–67.
219
See Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153 [hereinafter 1802 Act]. See generally
Kettner, supra note 63, at 246 (describing the 1802 Act as the “last major piece of legislation” on the subject of naturalization during the nineteenth century).
220
See 1802 Act, supra note 219, at 153–54.
221
See id. at 153.
222
The Kentucky Palladium reported that the object of the 1802 bill was to repeal
the Act of 1798 and go back to the terms of 1795. See Franklin, supra note 186, at
106–07.
223
See 1802 Act, supra note 219, at 154.
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had failed to comply with the registration requirement of the 1798
legislation.224 The Act also took pains to eliminate the retroactive
features of prior law.225 Thus, for the class of 1790–1795, the Act restored the two-year residency requirement (even though, as a practical matter, many members of this class could have satisfied the
five-year term specified in the 1798 law). For much of the remainder of the nineteenth century (with the notable exception of legislation in the 1880s that led to Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting),
Congress continued to emphasize prospectivity in its immigration
legislation, frequently employing savings clauses to preserve rights
conferred under earlier laws.226
C. The Scope of Congress’s Naturalization Power
Early legislation also resolved some uncertainty over the extent
to which the exercise of federal power over naturalization was
thought to exclude any concurrent role for the states in defining
the rights of aliens. While early decisions of the courts took somewhat conflicting views of the exclusive character of Congress’s
naturalization authority,227 Congress addressed the issue in the 1802
Act. The focus of section 4 of the Act was on the citizenship status
of the children of those naturalized under earlier laws.228 The Act
declared minor children citizens of the United States if their par224

Franklin, supra note 186, at 108–09.
See 1802 Act, supra note 219, at 154.
See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 531 (1955) (noting that savings
clauses that involved broad inclusive provisions had been employed since 1906 and
“manifested an intention on the part of Congress to save rights which had accrued
under prior laws”).
227
Compare Collet v. Collet, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 294, 295–96 (C.C.D. Pa. 1792) (states
retain right to naturalize), and Portier v. LeRoy, 1 Yeates 371 (Pa. 1794) (same), with
United States v. Villato, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 370, 372 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (states lack power
to naturalize). See also Neuman, Strangers, supra note 3, at 44–49. Neuman argues
that well into the nineteenth century, states continued to regulate immigration.
Rather than expressly regulating immigration, states exercised their police power to
limit the type of immigrants who could enter the state. Pointing to the majority’s dicta
in City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837), in which the opinion states
that it was “competent and . . . necessary for a state to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts,” id. at
142, Neuman concludes that the Supreme Court generally approved of such legislation, as long as it did not interfere with Congress’s foreign commerce power. Neuman,
Strangers, supra note 3, at 45–48.
228
See 1802 Act, supra note 219, at 155.
225
226
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ent(s) had been duly naturalized “under any of the laws of the
United States” or under the laws “of any one of the said states.”229
But naturalization under state law counted only if it took place
“previous to the passing of any law on that subject, by the government of the United States.”230 State naturalizations were thus effective only until Congress adopted the Act of 1790, and were invalid
thereafter. As Dane explained, this provision “tends to settle the
long agitated question, whether a State government has any power
to naturalize aliens, since Congress passed laws on the subject.”231
(The legislation, declaring federal power exclusive of the states, recalls the 1773 Act of Parliament declaring Britain’s naturalization
regime exclusive of those in the colonies.)
Early legislative practice sheds light on one final puzzle about
the breadth of Congress’s power over naturalization policy. An
early draft of the 1790 naturalization law specified gradations of
citizenship: Aliens could own property after one year but would
have to wait two years before they could stand for election to state
and federal offices.232 During debates over these provisions, some
took the position that Congress’s power was limited to conferring
citizenship and did not extend to the definition of gradations of
citizenship.233 Others took quite the opposite position, urging that
229

Id.
Id. Congress may have attempted to resolve the issue in the 1795 Act, declaring
that an alien may be admitted as a “citizen of the United States, or any of them, on
the following conditions, and not otherwise.” 1795 Act, supra note 197, at 414. One
can read the provision as an attempt by Congress to preempt state control of the field
of naturalization.
231
4 Dane, supra note 206, at 711; see also Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259,
269 (1817) (Marshall, C.J.) (proclaiming a consensus that Congress has sole power to
naturalize). The consensus doubtless emerged in the nineteenth century; we have a
great deal of evidence that state naturalizations continued through the 1790s. See,
e.g., Franklin, supra note 186, at 84–90 (explaining that the difficulty in complying
with federal naturalization requirements resulted in many aliens turning to state procedures for naturalization); see also supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text (Rep.
Gallatin recounting the continuing efforts of immigrants in Pennsylvania to seek naturalization under state law).
232
In particular, the bill would have conferred all rights of citizenship, including
property ownership, to those who took the oath and resided in the United States for a
single year. The right to hold public office would ripen after two years. See Cong.
Reg. (Feb. 3, 1790), reprinted in 12 DHFFC, supra note 163, at 146.
233
See id. at 151 (remarks of Rep. White (Virginia)) (once an alien attains citizenship, the power of Congress ceases to operate); see also id. at 148 (remarks of Rep.
Laurance (New York)) (questioning Congress’s power to specify the rights of a new
230
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all incidents of the status of resident aliens and new citizens were
subject to federal regulation.234 Ultimately, Congress decided to
drop the gradation provisions in favor of a rule that simply specified the terms on which citizenship was to be conferred. But one
cannot conclude from the omission of gradations that Congress
reached a considered conclusion that its power did not extend so
far. To the contrary, the degree of state-to-state variability on issues relating to property ownership and political rights would have
made the task of framing a uniform rule quite daunting.235 Many
may have concluded that, whatever the scope of federal power, it
was better to leave the issue to the states. Thus, William Maclay’s
diary records his view that Congress possessed the power in question, but that the interests of Pennsylvania would be better served
if federal law did not define alien property rights.236
citizen to stand for state election); cf. id. at 149 (remarks of Rep. Madison (Virginia))
(noting that the ability of Congress to admit an alien to rights “step by step” poses
questions “of some nicety”). Madison had earlier taken the position that Congress
would have power to establish gradations of citizenship.
234
See id. at 153 (remarks of Rep. Tucker (South Carolina)) (expressing “no doubt”
as to Congress’s power to provide for progressive admission to citizenship); id. at 155–
56 (remarks of Rep. Stone (Maryland)) (supporting the claim that Congress can admit
to citizenship “step by step”); New-York Daily Gazette, Feb. 4, 1790, reprinted in id.
at 156 (remarks of Rep. Jackson (Georgia)) (citing Blackstone’s discussion in support
of the progressive admission to rights of citizenship).
235
Cong. Reg. (Feb. 3, 1790), reprinted in id. at 150 (remarks of Rep. Smith (South
Carolina)) (noting that the proposed grant of political rights to the newly arrived
might cause “great uneasiness” in some “neighborhoods”).
236
See William Maclay, Diary (Mar. 8, 1790), in 9 Documentary History of the First
Federal Congress of the United States 214–15 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit
eds., 1988) [hereinafter 9 DHFFC] (noting the introduction of the naturalization bill
and recounting his efforts to authorize aliens to own lands before becoming citizens);
William Maclay, Diary (Mar. 9, 1790), in 9 DHFFC, supra, at 215–16 (recounting his
opposition to the two-year residency requirement as too restrictive and contrasting
the willingness of those in Pennsylvania to “rec[eive] and adopt[] strangers” with the
reluctance of those in New England); William Maclay, Diary (Mar. 12, 1790), in 9
DHFFC, supra, at 217 (noting that Pennsylvania has been “very liberal on the subject
of admitting strangers to citizenship” and that “we have benefited by it [and] still do
benefit”); William Maclay, Diary (Mar. 15, 1790), in 9 DHFFC, supra, at 218–19 (recounting his view that others wish to deprive Pennsylvania of the benefit of
“[im]migration” as a “source of population” and thus linking naturalization with immigration policy); William Maclay, Diary (Mar. 17, 1790), in 9 DHFFC, supra, at 220–
21 (recounting Ellsworth’s argument that power to hold lands was a feature of naturalization and was not properly extended to aliens until they were naturalized); William Maclay, Diary (Mar. 18, 1790), in 9 DHFFC, supra, at 222 (noting a division between senators as to whether federal authority under the naturalization clause
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Despite its failure to confer explicit rights on resident aliens
short of full citizenship, Congress clearly took the view that the reliance interests of such resident aliens deserved protection against
retroactive legislation. As we have already seen, the comments of
Representative Smith and the language of the 1790 Act both express some solicitude for the interests of those who had come to
America in reliance on the naturalization provisions of state law.237
The first naturalization act, moreover, left the decision to seek citizenship or remain as a resident alien in the hands of the immigrant.
Thus, the statute prescribed the conditions that would qualify an
alien for citizenship: race, residency, good character, and an oath to
support the Constitution. But the statute did not require that the
alien get in line for citizenship by filing a declaration to that effect
as a condition of his entry into the country.238 Nor did the statute
establish a period of limitations that would foreclose citizenship for
those who had lived in the country for a time without having taken
steps to secure citizenship. In other words, the statute contemplated that aliens might live for years in the United States as denizens, domiciliaries, or permanent residents, entitled to citizenship if
they chose to pursue it but not required to do so as a condition of
continued residence.239
In addition, it was this group of prospective or “inchoate” citizens that Congress sought to protect from retrospective legislation
in its second naturalization law. The statute adopted in 1795 altered the rules significantly, extending the residency period to five
embraced the power to define property ownership rights of aliens and noting that
Ellsworth and Strong both took a broad view of federal power); William Maclay, Diary (Mar. 19, 1790), in 9 DHFFC, supra, at 223 (concluding that since the Pennsylvania senators could not “get the rights of [aliens to hold] property fully acknowledged, it is best that the Naturalization bill say nothing about it”).
237
See supra notes 155, 195–96 and accompanying text.
238
Thus, the 1790 Act contained nothing that would require the alien to register or
declare an interest in citizenship and nothing that foreclosed citizenship to aliens who
had waited too long before petitioning for naturalization.
239
Denizens were aliens who were admitted to some, but not all, of the privileges of
citizenship through the issuance of the King’s letters patent. Blackstone explained the
matter as follows: “A denizen is an alien born, but who has obtained . . . letters patent
to make him an English subject. . . . A denizen is in a kind of middle state between an
alien and a natural-born subject, and partakes of both of them.” 1 Blackstone, supra
note 25, at *374; see also Craw v. Ramsay, Vaughan 274, 124 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1074
(1670) (“[A] denizen of England by letters patents for life, in tayl, or in fee, whereby
he becomes a subject in regard of his person.”).
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years and requiring a declaration of intent to seek citizenship after
three years. These changes would have no impact on those that had
already gained citizenship under the 1790 law. As we have seen,
however, the 1795 legislation allows denizens or lawful permanent
resident aliens already in the country to pursue citizenship on the
same terms that had previously applied to them. Only those aliens
who entered the country after the effective date of the statute were
subject to the new dispensation. The statute thus recognizes a useful distinction between Congress’s plenary power over the rules of
naturalization that apply to newly admitted aliens and its obligation to preserve the rules applicable to those who had already
moved to the United States and established a residence here in reliance on an earlier approach.
To summarize the lessons of this Part of the Article, the framing
of the Constitution proceeded on the assumption that Congress
was to establish a single uniform rule of naturalization throughout
the United States. Members of the early Congresses understood
the constitutional requirement of uniformity both as obliging Congress to adopt public laws of general applicability on the subject,
and as ruling out private bills. Moreover, Congress took the position that uniformity disables the states from administering their
own separate or concurrent system of naturalization. Finally, the
clause, requiring Congress to establish a uniform rule, suggests the
foreclosure of retrospective changes in the rules. Congress viewed
the trigger for the assurance of prospectivity as beginning when an
alien established lawful residence in the United States. At that
point, Congress viewed itself as bound to refrain from making retroactive changes in the rules that govern the alien’s status and
eventual admission to citizenship.
IV. RECLAIMING THE IMMIGRATION CONSTITUTION OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC
We think these underappreciated features of the early Republic’s approach to immigration issues have important implications
for current debates over immigration law. In this Part, we develop
three related ideas. First, we contend that the requirement of an established rule of naturalization provides additional support for imposing limits on some kinds of retroactive legislation and some features of the so-called plenary power doctrine. Scholars have
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couched arguments against retroactive legislation in due process
terms; we think our interpretation of the naturalization clause bolsters these arguments and provides a firm constitutional foundation for a requirement of prospective lawmaking by Congress.240
Second, we argue that the requirement of an established and
uniform rule forecloses the adoption of private bills. We view the
rise of private legislation as an unfortunate feature of modern immigration and naturalization policy. Members of Congress have
sometimes adopted harsh general measures to govern most citizenship applicants and have simultaneously supported private bills
that would set aside these harsh measures in specific cases. We
think legislative lenity can play an appropriate role in the process
of naturalization (as the curative legislation of the Jeffersonian era
reveals), but it should apply across the board to all aliens in the
same situation. Indeed, we see a connection between the two developments: once Congress came to view itself as enjoying the
power to address citizenship issues in particular cases, it was but a
short leap to the abandonment of the commitment to prospectivity
that had characterized its early legislation.241
Finally, we think that the limits of plenary power and the prohibition on private bills also shed light on the propriety of treating
immigration and naturalization issues as matters of “public right”
to be shunted off to executive tribunals and immunized from judicial review. Properly understood, the public rights doctrine does
not provide carte blanche to Congress in regulating matters between the government and individual aliens. Instead, as we show,
the doctrine should come into play only where Congress retains
control over the distribution of government largesse, as in the case
of its control over government benefits under the property or appropriations power. Congress has no case-by-case control over
naturalization that can provide a foundation for the denial of a judicial role.242
240

See David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process Limits
on Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 Geo. L.J. 2481, 2482 (1998) (“Not
coincidentally, the most extreme restrictions the 1996 Congress enacted fell on the
doubly disadvantaged, noncitizens who have been convicted of crimes.”).
241
See Act of Feb. 13, 1839, ch. 23, 6 Stat. 750, 750–51 (granting relief to a Baltimore-based physician, Dr. John Campbell White).
242
We find confirmation of our suggestion that the public rights doctrine does not
undercut the right of aliens, who are resident in the United States, to secure judicial
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Our proposed revival of early Republic constitutionalism has its
risks and drawbacks. One cannot always readily translate the
norms of the eighteenth century into a body of constitutional rules
for today. But in the case of immigration law, the developments of
the early Republic have important lessons to teach us. Rather than
viewing the plenary power doctrine through the lens of the nation’s
restrictive attitude toward new immigration in the late nineteenth
century, the experience of the early Republic helps us to locate a
constitutional history in which leading statesmen welcomed the
idea of national growth through immigration. To be sure, the
Framers had quite limited ideas about the sort of immigrants they
expected to naturalize: only white European immigrants were welcome. But within those boundaries, the Framers established and
administered a system of naturalization rules that displayed a striking degree of solicitude for the rights of resident aliens.
A. Understanding the Relevance of the Naturalization Clause
Before we turn to specific arguments, however, we address a
more general question of interpretive theory. We propose to apply
the limits on congressional power encompassed in the naturalization clause to all issues of immigration and naturalization law, including matters that do not directly implicate citizenship. One
might object on methodological grounds to the proposed reliance
on eighteenth-century naturalization law as a source of modern
constitutional limits on the role of Congress in immigration law.
Apart from objections based on concerns with originalist methodology, one might take the view (common among students of immigration law) that immigration and naturalization comprise two
fundamentally different compartments of law. If one accepted this
categorical view, it might seem to follow that the constitutional limits on Congress’s naturalization power do not apply to immigration
issues. Thus, one might conclude that Congress faces textual re-

review of removal decisions in the Court’s recent decision Kucana v. Holder, No. 08911 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2010). Citing separation-of-powers concerns, the Court invoked its
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and rejected a suggested limit on the power of the federal courts to review petitions to reopen removal
proceedings.
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strictions when legislating in the exercise of its naturalization
power, but confronts fewer limits when it regulates immigration.
We offer several responses. First, at the time of the framing,
naturalization rules essentially exhausted the category of immigration policy.243 As we have seen, during the eighteenth century, market factors, including the cost and length of the voyage, ensured
that immigrants were making a permanent commitment to the nation.244 The desire of aliens to hold property would encourage
speedy naturalization among those who expected to seek their fortunes on frontier farms; the rules of naturalization, which determined the speed and manner in which the rights of citizenship, including the right to own property, accrued, in turn, would
effectively control immigration. Only later in the nineteenth century, when the steamship drove down the price of the voyage and
new immigrants entered an industrial workforce, would it become
possible to envision a national immigration law that applied to individuals who could not, or may not desire to claim access to naturalized citizenship.245 Even today, much of what we think of as immigration policy—regulating who may come into the country, who
may stay, and for what duration—simply ensures that certain immigrants cannot enjoy the benefits of naturalization without going
through the procedures established by Congress.
Second, the breadth of the Framers’ conception of naturalization
suggests that we should view Congress’s immigration power as a
subset of its naturalization authority, rather than as a separate
category. We think the failure to perceive this derivative quality of
immigration underlies the Court’s invention of the plenary power
doctrine in Chae Chan Ping.246 The law excluding Chinese nationals
was said to apply both to new arrivals and to those like the peti243

Scholars recognize the need to translate grants of power to take account of technological change. While the Constitution does not expressly empower Congress to
establish an Air Force, one might derive authority for such a modern undertaking
from its power to raise and support an Army and Navy (the two branches of the
armed forces known to the Framers). See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71
Tex. L. Rev. 1165, 1203 (1993).
244
See supra note 25.
245
See id. At risk of belaboring the obvious, Africans brought to the United States
as slaves came against their will and could not later claim citizenship under rules that
limited naturalization to free white persons.
246
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581, 609 (1889).
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tioner who had established residence in the United States and had
obtained a certificate entitling them to re-enter the country.247
While he was out of the country in reliance on the certificate, the
petitioner’s right to re-enter was legislatively curtailed.248 In Fong
Yue Ting, by contrast, new legislation required all resident Chinese
laborers to register within one year of the Act’s adoption.249 The
petitioners were arrested for having failed to register and were subjected to deportation proceedings.250
In both cases, the Court upheld the application of these rules,
despite their retroactive effect. Although the Court spoke with
unanimity in Chae Chan Ping, the decision in Fong Yue Ting was
more closely divided.251 The majority began where it left off in the
earlier case, by denying that the petitioners had acquired any right
to remain in the country except on whatever terms Congress chose
to specify.252 Without a right, the aliens were subject to Congress’s
plenary control.253 The majority then turned to the terms of the

247
Id. at 582. The Act prohibited Chinese laborers from entering the United States if
they had departed before the passage of the Act, even if they had obtained a certificate under a previous act entitling them to return. Id. The petitioner challenged the
Act as violating existing treaties between the United States and China and the rights
vested under those treaties through previous acts. Id. at 599–600. Notably, petitioner
did not challenge the Act on equal protection grounds. See Gabriel J. Chin, Chae
Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, in Immigration Stories 7, 15 (David A. Martin & Peter
H. Schuck eds., 2005) (noting that such a challenge would have failed since the Fifth
Amendment had not yet been interpreted to prohibit Congress from discriminating
on the basis of race).
248
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
249
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 699 n.1 (1893).
250
Id. at 699–704.
251
Id. at 732 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 744 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761
(Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
252
Id. at 707 (“The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not
been naturalized or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests
upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and
prevent their entrance into the country.”).
253
See id. at 713 (“The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting
international relations, is vested in the political departments of the government, and is
to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive
authority according to the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the paramount
law of the Constitution, to intervene.”); id. at 713–14 (“The power of Congress, therefore, to expel, like the power to exclude aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from
the country, may be exercised entirely through executive officers, or Congress may
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Constitution to determine whether anything foreclosed deportation for failure to register.254 Here, the Court reached the crucial
conclusion that a deportation proceeding was not criminal and did
not, therefore, trigger the application of the usual panoply of constitutional protections.255 Scholars view Chae Chan Ping and Fong
Yue Ting as a reflection of the racism and xenophobia of the day.256
We agree with that assessment. But we believe the Court was
also influenced by its perception that the individual petitioners
were not entitled to naturalized citizenship under applicable law.257
In Fong Yue Ting, the Court drew an analogy between deportation
and exclusion that seemed to emphasize the importance of naturalization: “The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who
have not been naturalized or taken any steps towards becoming
citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their en-

call in the aid of the judiciary to ascertain any contested facts on which an alien’s right
to be in the country has been made by Congress to depend.”).
254
Id. at 711–14. While the legislation in Chae Chan Ping operated with clear retroactive effect, that in Fong Yue Ting may present a closer question. One can argue that
the Chinese laborers, having chosen to remain in the United States after the promulgation of the registration law, became fairly subject to the rule imposing deportation
as a remedy. Yet the aliens in Fong Yue Ting were not involved in acts of continuing
illegality. Cf. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 44–46 (2006) (interpreting
statute as imposing a permissibly prospective, if somewhat harsher, rule of deportation for undocumented aliens who chose to continue their illegal presence in the
United States after the new regime was enacted).
255
See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (“He has not, therefore, been deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law, and the provisions of the Constitution,
securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures,
and cruel and unusual punishments, have no application.”). As noted below, subsequent cases have relied on the non-criminal conception of deportation in concluding
that the ex post facto clause does not restrict Congress’s authority to impose deportation on a retroactive basis.
256
Morawetz, supra note 7, at 98, 123 & n.115.
257
At the time that Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting were decided, the law foreclosed individuals of Chinese descent from seeking naturalized citizenship. See Lucy
E. Salyer, Wong Kim Ark: The Contest over Birthright Citizenship, in Immigration
Stories, supra note 247, at 57–58 (reporting that, by 1882, the federal courts had held,
and Congress had decreed, that individuals of Chinese descent were not “white persons” for purposes of qualifying for naturalized citizenship). One might attack this
denial of access to naturalized citizenship as itself retroactive if not for the fact that
the “white person” requirement had been part of the naturalization law since the
Founding.
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trance into the country.”258 On this view, Chinese laborers were
admitted at Congress’s “sufferance,”259 were not entitled to naturalization, and gained no rights upon establishing residence in the
United States.260 Just as Congress could exclude new Chinese laborers from the country, so too could it exclude those who returned to the country or deport those who remained or failed to
register.
The centrality of naturalization issues in Chae Chan Ping and
Fong Yue Ting highlights an important but often overlooked truth.
The decision to uphold the power of Congress was influenced by
the Court’s perception that Chinese laborers did not qualify to
claim naturalized citizenship. The absence of any prospect of naturalization explains why the Court treated all Chinese laborers as a
group, lumping together those who had never been to the country
with those who had established a residence in the United States
and secured a certificate enabling them to return. The Court apparently took the view that residence, without any prospect of
naturalized citizenship, left the Chinese subject to Congress’s
power to exclude. The dissenting Justices apparently recognized
that the petitioners’ inability to secure naturalized citizenship was
doing some of the work for the majority; Justice Field expressed
doubt that the Court would uphold similar treatment of resident
aliens from England, Germany, France, and Ireland,261 aliens who
were presumptively entitled to naturalization.
We do not believe that the Court’s unspoken premise can withstand careful scrutiny: Congress simply cannot escape the constraints of the naturalization clause by creating a class of individuals to whom the protections of the clause do not apply. We reach
this conclusion for two reasons. First, as a logical matter, the decision of Congress to deny Chinese nationals access to naturalized
258

Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707; see also id. at 724 (describing petitioners as aliens
who have “taken no steps toward becoming citizens” and are “incapable of becoming
such under the naturalization laws”).
259
Id. at 723–24.
260
See id. at 716 (“Chinese persons not born in this country have never been recognized as citizens of the United States, nor authorized to become such under the naturalization laws.”).
261
Id. at 750 (Field, J., dissenting); see id. at 743 (Brewer, J., dissenting); see also
Brief for the Respondent at 49, United States v. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)
(No. 1345) (describing the “obnoxious subjects of China”).
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citizenship is itself an exercise of power conferred in the naturalization clause. To the extent that the naturalization clause (or another
provision of the Constitution) limits congressional power, it would
make little sense to conclude that Congress can evade constitutional limits by excluding certain individuals from the protection of
the clause. Second, we note that the natural-born children of Chinese nationals (and other aliens present in the United States) are
themselves regarded as citizens of the United States.262 The citizenship of children born to aliens resident in the United States offers
an additional reason to regard residence as a factor that triggers
limits on congressional power to exclude.263 Everyone who establishes a lawful residence in the United States, whether on the immigration track or the naturalization track, should thus enjoy the
assurances of prospectivity and uniformity embedded in the naturalization clause.
Finally, we note that the issues of law posed by resident aliens,
even the illegal or undocumented, do not fall into categorically
separate bodies of immigration and naturalization law.264 Consider
the representative example of Jagdish Chadha, the alien whose
case led to the invalidation of the one-House veto.265 Mr. Chadha
came to the United States on a student visa, an immigration status
that assumes he would return to his home in Kenya to practice
dentistry. But Mr. Chadha overstayed his visa, hoping to establish a
dental practice in the United States. Although he was put in line
for deportation, the Attorney General determined that Chadha deserved discretionary relief and the opportunity to switch to the
naturalization track and secure a permanent resident visa. It was
262

See Wong Kim Ark v. United States, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898).
To be sure, the federal courts have long rejected the argument that deportation of
the alien parent operates as a de facto deportation of the citizen child. For a summary
and critique, see Sonia Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of
International Law, 21 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 213, 259–60 (2003). Yet arguments for the
preservation of an intact family continue to inform immigration policy toward the
alien parents of citizen children.
264
One can make two responses to the argument against the extension of naturalization precepts. First, as a practical matter, the lines of separation between immigration
and naturalization may not be quite so hard and fast as some assume. Even today,
most resident aliens on the immigration track, assuming they have played by the rules,
remain eligible to switch to the naturalization track. Much immigration law thus influences the choices of prospective candidates for naturalized citizenship.
265
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
263
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that grant of discretionary relief that was restored when the Supreme Court invalidated the one-House veto.266 Chadha’s case illustrates the fluid boundary between the rules of immigration and
naturalization and shows that lawful residence in the United States,
on whatever terms, should trigger the application of the rules of
prospectivity, uniformity, and transparency that the Framers embedded in the naturalization clause. We now propose to define
those rules more formally.
B. No Retroactive Changes in the Law
Among other lessons, the text and early history of the naturalization clause demonstrate that the Framers of the Constitution
meant for Congress to establish a public and relatively stable regime for the integration of new citizens into the country. Not only
did the Framers display consistent concern with ensuring the prospective development of rules of naturalization, but the members
of Congress in the early Republic consistently acted as if norms of
prospectivity were guiding their legislative work.267 Both with the
establishment of the first naturalization law in 1790 and with the
changes adopted in 1795 to lengthen the required period of residence, Congress took care to protect those already residing in the
country. This solicitude for resident aliens reflects a general understanding that those who immigrated to the country under a particular naturalization regime were entitled to the benefit of existing
law. The only legislation in which an early Congress departed from
a strict regime of prospectivity—adopted during the crisis of
1798—was ameliorated after an appeal to the Constitution’s
prospectivity requirement and was repealed when cooler heads
prevailed and norms of prospectivity were restored.
We view the requirement of an established rule, operating in favor of the reliance interests of resident aliens, as providing the basis for a challenge to certain features of the so-called plenary power

266

In the end, Mr. Chadha became a naturalized citizen and recently won an award
for his contributions to the field of dental education from Louisiana State University.
District Reports, The Key (Int’l Coll. of Dentists), 2006, at 50, 73, available at
http://www.usaicd.org/information/theKEY/The_Key_2006web.pdf; Lena Williams,
Faces Behind Famous Cases, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1985, at C1.
267
See supra Section III.B.
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doctrine. Under the terms of this much-criticized doctrine,268 the
Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has broad power to
rework the rules of immigration and naturalization.269 This power
corresponds to the Framers’ perception that Congress was to have
broad authority over immigration and could foreclose certain
classes of aliens from access to naturalized citizenship. In addition,
the Court has upheld the application of new immigration rules on a
retrospective basis.270 In this section, we sketch the evolution of the
plenary power doctrine and show that it conflicts with the requirement of prospectivity that inheres in the obligation that Congress
establish a rule of naturalization.
Following the conclusion in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting,
the non-criminal characterization of deportation proceedings has
played a crucial role in denying resident aliens the benefit of norms
of prospectivity. Thus, in Galvan v. Press, the Court confronted a
law that made membership in the Communist Party a basis for deportation proceedings.271 At the time of the alien’s membership in
the Party, such affiliation was not forbidden; indeed, he had left the
Party before the new Party-member deportation provision took effect.272 In an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, the Court appeared to
acknowledge strong arguments in favor of reading some assurance
of prospectivity into the Constitution.273 In the end, though, the
268
See Neuman, Strangers, supra note 3, at 134–37 (noting the uncertainty in defining the plenary power doctrine and scholars’ critique of the doctrine); see also Motomura, supra note 1, at 1626 (explaining that “[c]ourts have been reluctant to apply
constitutional norms and principles to test the validity of subconstitutional immigration law” because of the “judicially created plenary power doctrine, under which
Congress and the executive branch have broad and often exclusive authority in immigration matters”); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Gold Door, 1993
Wis. L. Rev. 965, 965 (criticizing continued reliance on the plenary power doctrine).
269
Nancy Morawetz notes that the landmark cases establishing the plenary power
doctrine in immigration were issued within years of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896). These cases “built on the idea that race could be determinative of a group’s
ability to assimilate as Americans.” See Morawetz, supra note 7, at 98 n.9 (referring to
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) and Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 743 (1893)); see also Legomsky, Plenary Power, supra
note 6, at 288–89.
270
See Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 611,
615–16 (2006); see also infra notes 271–74.
271
See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 523 (1954).
272
Id. at 523–24.
273
Id. at 530–31 (noting that “[i]n light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due process as a limitation upon all powers of Congress, even the war power,
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Court concluded that the “slate [was] not clean” and that the
“whole volume” of history supporting the plenary power of Congress over immigration required reaffirmation of the “unbroken
rule of this Court that [the ex post facto clause] has no application
to deportation.”274
One can fairly ask how much of Galvan v. Press remains good
law. Although members of the Court continue to cite the case as
support for the plenary power doctrine,275 others have taken pains
to avoid interpretations of the law that would produce retroactive
deportation effects. In INS v. St. Cyr,276 the Court considered challenges to provisions of two important immigration reform laws of
the 1990s. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), subjected many aliens,
including lawful permanent residents (LPRs) to deportation for
crimes committed before the legislation was passed.277 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, now the Department of
Homeland Security) took the position that 440(d) of AEDPA
eliminated discretionary waiver from deportation for commission
of certain offenses under 212(c).278 Advocates challenged this determination on both statutory and due process grounds.279
much could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that the due process
clause qualifies the scope of political discretion heretofore recognized as belonging to
Congress in regulating the entry and deportation of aliens. And since the intrinsic
consequences of deportation are so close to punishment for crime, it might fairly be
said also that the ex post facto Clause, even though applicable only to punitive legislation, should be applied to deportation” (internal citations omitted)).
274
Id. at 531.
275
See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1180 n.2 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 547 n.9 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
276
533 U.S. 289 (2001).
277
See Morawetz, supra note 7, at 99 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 28, 40, 42, 50 U.S.C.) [hereinafter AEDPA] and Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.)
3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IIRIRA]).
278
Memorandum from David A. Martin, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service to all Regional Counsels and District Counsels (Apr. 26, 1996), cited
in Nancy Morawetz, INS v. St. Cyr: The Campaign to Preserve Court Review and
Stop Retroactive Deportation Laws, in Immigration Stories, supra note 247, at 279,
283 n.11.
279
Nancy Morawetz, INS v. St. Cyr: The Campaign to Preserve Court Review and
Stop Retroactive Deportation Laws, in Immigration Stories, supra note 247, at 279,
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The Supreme Court considered two elements of this challenge.
First, the Court evaluated the government’s argument that the
1996 amendments foreclosed federal courts from exercising habeas
jurisdiction to review the statutory bar to discretionary relief.280 Invoking the doctrine of constitutional doubt, the Court held that the
statute failed to contain the requisite clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.281 Second, the Court addressed the substantive question of whether the amendments could
be applied retroactively, thus depriving the petitioner of discretionary 212(c) relief that had been available when he committed
and pled guilty to his deportable offense.282 Citing the interpretative
canon that presumes Congress does not intend retroactive application of its laws,283 the Court held that the law did not bar discretionary review.284 Yet the Court was quick to note that there was no
constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws, as long as Congress spoke with the requisite clarity.285
While St. Cyr limits retroactive application of laws to some degree, it does little to protect aliens’ reliance interests from a deter284–97 (describing the methods used to challenge the transitional and permanent
rules under AEDPA and IIRIRA).
280
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292–93.
281
Id. at 298–99. Congress responded by enacting an Act with such a clear statement.
The REAL ID Act of 2005 “foreclose[s] the use of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to obtain review
of removal orders and their implementation.” Medellin-Reyes v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d
721, 722 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Jaber v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 223, 230 (6th Cir. 2007).
In any case, interpretation of the amendments as a bar to judicial review of pure questions of law, such as that presented by St. Cyr, might give rise to constitutional questions. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300–01 (suspension clause might be implicated if the Court
interpreted the amendments to strip habeas jurisdiction).
282
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293.
283
Id. at 316 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1993)
(“[This] presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know
what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should
not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the principle that the legal effect of conduct
should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place
has timeless and universal human appeal.” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted))).
284
Id. at 326.
285
Id. at 316 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272–73) (“Requiring clear intent assures
that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.”).
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mined Congress. Scholars have structured arguments against retroactive application of immigration laws on due process grounds.286
Our suggested reading of the naturalization clause complements
this scholarship, but bases its rejection of retroactivity on the requirement that Congress establish a uniform rule. This suggested
reformulation of the plenary power doctrine permits Congress to
change the law as applied to aliens, so long as it complies with
norms of prospectivity. It thus corresponds to the best reading of
the naturalization clause and to the distrust of retroactive legislation that informed the immigration law of the early Republic and
the late nineteenth century.287
Such a reformulated doctrine might better explain certain features of the constitutional law of immigration and naturalization.
To begin with, the Court’s decisions provide some support for the
proposed reading of the naturalization clause as a source of qualified power over aliens. Thus, in INS v. Chadha, the Court characterized the clause as providing Congress with “unreviewable authority” over the regulation of aliens, subject to the requirement
that Congress choose a “constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power.”288 Our view of the naturalization clause
helps to give content to these constitutionally permissible means.
In addition, by drawing on the naturalization clause, the Court
could identify limits on retroactivity without questioning its earlier
conclusion that deportation was a non-criminal proceeding to
which the ex post facto clause does not apply. Such an approach
would occasion less doctrinal dislocation. Finally, the suggested
approach would provide a firmer foundation for some results that
courts have been reaching in other ways. For instance, in assessing
286

See generally Morawetz, supra note 7.
See Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 559–60 (1884) (invoking the presumption against retroactivity, among other considerations, in refusing to give retroactive effect to a requirement that Chinese nationals obtain a certificate to gain reentry into the country); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 633–34 (1888)
(applying Chew Heong); see also United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 535 (1955)
(“The whole development of this general savings clause, its predecessors accompanying each of the recent codifications in the field of immigration and naturalization,
manifests a well-established congressional policy not to strip aliens of advantages
gained under prior laws.”); cf. Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 61–62
(1892) (noting that aliens domiciled in the United States enjoy some citizenship-like
privileges and immunities).
288
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–41 (1983).
287
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whether an individual had qualified for derivative citizenship, the
Second Circuit has applied the law in effect as of the date of the
alien’s completion of the last step necessary to qualify.289 Our suggested understanding of the naturalization clause provides an entirely straightforward basis for such results.
Perhaps most intriguingly, our approach suggests an alternative
basis for the commonplace, but nonetheless puzzling, conclusion
that the Constitution’s protections do not apply to aliens without
property or presence in the United States. One sees this conclusion
frequently stated in territorial terms, as if the Constitution applies
only to immigration matters that take place inside the territory of
the United States.290 One also sees it reflected in the cases that afford resident aliens greater rights to contest deportation than nonresident aliens have to contest their exclusion from the United
States.291 Yet such a territorially restrictive view of the Constitution
has become increasingly difficult to square with the Court’s recent
decision that the habeas non-suspension clause applies to aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court invalidated congressional restrictions on the right of aliens to seek
habeas review of their confinement, despite the fact that the detention occurred outside the sovereign territory of the United States
and the aliens in question lacked any property or presence in the
United States.292 If constitutional limits apply to the government
when it imposes detention overseas (as one of us has argued previously),293 then it may be difficult to contend that the Constitution’s

289

See Ashton v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2005) (“To determine whether
Ashton obtained U.S. citizenship as a result of his mother’s naturalization, we apply
the law in effect when Ashton fulfilled the last requirement for derivative citizenship.”); see also Hernandez de Anderson v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that law eliminating suspension of deportation for aliens who had been convicted of certain crimes did not apply to alien who sought naturalization and suspension before the act took effect).
290
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269, 274–75 (1990).
291
Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 78 Tex. L. Rev.
1661, 1670–71 (2000) [hereinafter Neuman, Immigration Law] (citing Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–34 (1982); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537, 542, 544 (1950)).
292
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008).
293
See James E. Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on
Terror, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 497, 499 (2006).
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protections apply only to aliens with some presence in the country.294
Rather than thinking of constitutional protections in territorial
terms (and as presumptively inapplicable to government activity
outside the United States), it may be more fruitful to evaluate the
rights of aliens in terms of the residential trigger of the prospectivity assurances in the naturalization clause. As we have seen, the
Framers regarded the norm of prospectivity as applying to aliens
who had established a physical residence in the United States in reliance on an existing framework for admission to citizenship. The
focus on residence reflected historical practice; under every public
law of naturalization with which the Framers were familiar, a specified period of residence was required before the alien could apply
for access to citizenship.295 Once a residential presence was established, retroactive changes in the framework for obtaining citizenship were viewed as inconsistent with the nation’s obligations under the Constitution. Building on these views of the Framers, one
can fashion a fairly straightforward distinction between the rights
owed to aliens who establish a residential presence here and those,
outside the country, who have yet to make their way to the United
States. Non-resident aliens would appear to fall into a group to
which Congress owes no obligation of prospectivity under the
naturalization clause. Yet the same group might well claim rights
under the habeas non-suspension clause or other constitutional
provisions that protect individuals from government conduct overseas. By grounding its analysis in the residential focus of the naturalization clause, the Court could justify a territorial distinction between the duties owed to resident and non-resident aliens and
avoid the anomalies of viewing other rights-protective provisions
of the Constitution as territorially restricted.
294

To be sure, the Court limited its decision to a conclusion that the habeas nonsuspension clause has full effect in Guantanamo Bay. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at
2262. But it remains uncertain what weight to give to this limitation; after all, the
Court had no reason to consider other provisions of the Constitution. For a characteristically rich and insightful exploration of these issues, see Gerald L. Neuman, The
Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 259 (2009)
[hereinafter Neuman, Extraterritorial Constitution].
295
As explained in Parts I and II, residence played a role in Parliament’s naturalization act of 1740, in the laws adopted by the newly independent states, and in Congress’s naturalization act of 1790.
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C. No Private Naturalization Bills
Complementing the ban on retroactive legislation, the Framers’
decision to empower Congress to “establish an uniform rule of
naturalization” forecloses private naturalization bills. While the
private bill system, coupled with denization by the Crown, was an
acknowledged feature of colonial systems of naturalization, the
Framers specifically rejected the exercise of case-by-case legislative
control.296 As we have seen, such case-by-case naturalization decisions, like other forms of legislative adjudication, were associated
in the minds of the Framers with the payment of exorbitant fees
and the production of inherently arbitrary and discriminatory results.297 We think the Framers rejected this system in favor of naturalization pursuant to a public law of general applicability. Such a
transparent and uniform model of naturalization would best give
effect to the Framers’ goal of “peopling” North America through
relatively liberal immigration policies. Moreover, such an interpretation best accounts for the Framers’ decision to drop an early version of the clause, which empowered Congress simply to regulate,
and to adopt a later draft that specifically required the establishment of a uniform rule.
In contending that the naturalization clause forecloses private
bills, we draw support from the action of early Congresses. As we
have seen, the First Congress deliberately rejected a petition for
the adoption of a private naturalization bill, apparently on constitutional grounds. Later Congresses held to this position. Despite a
flood of petitions, decrying the unfairness of the 1798 naturalization law, Congress declined to adopt private bills.298 Rather, as we
have seen, Congress chose to repeal the harsh 1798 law, and to
adopt curative legislation of general applicability that would provide relief across the board to all deserving applicants.299 Congress
296

One sees evidence of the rejection of case-by-case administration in the Constitution’s requirement that Congress adopt public and uniform laws of general application and in the rejection of naturalization petitions by the members of the First Congress. See supra notes 175–82 and accompanying text.
297
See supra p. 388. On the abuses inherent in private legislation, see Comment, The
Constitutionality of Private Acts of Congress, 49 Yale L.J. 712, 714–15 (1940) (noting
maladministration and widespread abuses at various times in the nation’s history).
298
For an account of the petitions to Congress in the late 1790s and early 1800s, see
Smith, supra note 177, at 112 (describing the flow of petitions as a “minor flood”).
299
See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text.
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refrained from adopting any private legislation until 1839, a full
fifty years after the founding. Even then, the bill simply corrected
the naturalization record of the petitioner to state his name correctly; it did not actually confer citizenship on the petitioner.300
Perhaps as a consequence, the congressional record from the date
of the Senate’s passage of the bill does not reflect any debate about
its constitutionality.301
Today, Congress plays a more active role in the consideration
and adoption of private immigration and naturalization laws. These
bills generally operate like the decrees of a court of equity, relieving the petitioner from the perceived harshness of the general
rule.302 The form of relief can vary; some laws waive the application
of a quota and admit a particular immigrant to the country while
others directly confer citizenship.303 One student of the legislative
process highlights its similarity to the practice of a court of equity
by emphasizing the importance of identifying a precedent for relief
among congressional records.304 While the number of petitions for
such legislation has ebbed and flowed over time, recent years have
witnessed a general downward trend from 7293 petitions in the
90th Congress (1967–1968) to 2866 in 1972 to 194 in the 100th
Congress (1987–1988). Of the petitions received, only twenty-one
private bills were adopted in the 1987–1988 period.305
Whatever the constitutional justification for private naturalization bills,306 it seems unlikely that they could be successfully chal300

See An Act for the relief of Dr. John Campbell White, ch. 23, 6 Stat. 750 (1839).
See Cong. Globe, 25th Cong., 3d Sess. 143 (1839).
302
See 117 Cong. Rec. 10,143 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Peter Rodino (New Jersey))
(describing private bills as providing an “extraordinary remedy” for those facing “unusual hardship”).
303
Congress conferred citizenship unconditionally as early as 1912. See An Act for
the relief of Eugene Prince, 37 Stat. 1346 (1912). See generally Maguire, supra note
37, at 3 (describing types of naturalization bills).
304
See Maguire, supra note 37, at 3–4.
305
Id. at 7.
306
One commentator argues that the uniformity requirement applies only to geographic uniformity and thus neither requires uniform treatment of individual petitioners nor rules out private bills. See Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 Harv. L.
Rev. 1684, 1685 (1966) (viewing private bills as “necessary and proper” to the effectuation of congressional power over naturalization). But note that the clause in question refers to a single uniform rule, made applicable to all prospective citizens. Even if
uniformity primarily addressed state-to-state variability, the requirement of a single
rule seemingly forecloses the disparate treatment of similarly situated candidates. See
301
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lenged in federal court. For starters, when Congress confers a private benefit on individual petitioners, one has difficulty identifying
a party that would have standing to challenge the benefit so conferred.307 Justiciability doctrines thus bar most conceivable challenges.308 Even if a court were inclined to hear such a case, private
naturalization bills almost invariably operate to provide relief to
the petitioner. Courts might understandably prefer to dodge litigation that seeks to challenge the conferral of such congressional
benefits. From the perspective of private litigants, then, private
bills may appear to constitute a victimless constitutional infringement and a necessary safeguard against harsh results. Indeed, some
argue that private bill practice encourages the submission of petitions that help to inform Congress about needed legal reforms.309

Crosskey, supra note 76, at 487 (arguing that the textual requirement of a “uniform
rule” was unnecessary if the Framers simply wanted to ensure that naturalization laws
were the same throughout the states); see also Hertz, supra note 124, at 113–15.
307
For a summary of standing doctrine and the requirement that individual litigants
suffer some concrete personal injury, see James E. Pfander, Principles of Federal Jurisdiction 30–34 (2006).
308
To be sure, a congressional grant of naturalized citizenship might be contested in
the context of a dispute over rights in real property. So long as common law alien
property disabilities remain intact, a party might challenge the right of an improperly
naturalized citizen to secure or convey good title to land. In addition, one alien might
argue for judicial relief from some aspect of the law by pointing to the passage of private legislation on behalf of another alien in the same situation. It seems highly
unlikely that a court would grant relief on such a basis. See INS v. Pangilinan, 486
U.S. 875, 876 (1988) (rejecting equal protection-based naturalization claims of Filipino veterans of World War II, despite fact that others in a similar situation had
gained naturalization rights).
309
For an argument that the private bill system benefits immigrants, see Kati L.
Griffith, Perfecting Public Immigration Legislation: Private Immigration Bills and
Deportable Lawful Permanent Residents, 18 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 273, 274 (2004) (contending that private bills serve an “informational” purpose by highlighting “necessary
changes to rigid or unintended aspects of the public law”); see also Maguire, supra
note 37, at 5. Yet a congressional refusal to adopt private bills would not deprive
Congress of the information supplied by private petitions for relief; the nation’s early
experience with curative legislation reveals that Congress can respond to claims of
unfair application of the law by adopting rules of lenity that apply across the board,
instead of doing so case by case. For evidence that widespread petitioning persisted in
the early Republic despite Congress’s refusal to adopt private bills, see Franklin, supra note 186, at 169–70 (describing petitions to Congress in 1824 and the adoption of
curative legislation in response); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration and the Right to
Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 667, 697–711 (2003) (describing petitions to Congress in
the period 1798–1804); cf. Griffith, supra, at 293 (quoting Rep. Barney Frank’s ac-
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Accepting that arguments can be made for private bills, their
benign appearance may mask a more malignant reality. The losers
in a private bill process are those who qualify for relief on the same
basis as the beneficiaries of private legislation but lack the clout or
connections necessary to secure their own bill. The Framers sought
to ensure that the benefits of naturalization were available on an
equal basis to all similarly situated persons and for this reason required Congress to establish a uniform rule. The passage of private
legislation undercuts the goal of transparency and uniformity in favor of the deal-making and log-rolling of the legislative process.
Perhaps it comes as no surprise, given the history of private naturalization bills in England, that seven members of Congress in the
ABSCAM scandal were convicted of accepting bribes in exchange
for an agreement to push private naturalization bills.310 Congress
should end the practice; indeed, some hopeful evidence suggests
that Congress has increasingly assigned the exercise of discretion to
executive branch officials and has moved to limit the number of
private bills.311
Even if the federal courts will have no occasion to invalidate private naturalization bills, our interpretation of the naturalization
clause has a role to play in understanding the separation of powers
doctrine in the immigration context. Indeed, our account of the
limited legislative role dovetails nicely with Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in INS v. Chadha, a case best known for invalidating the one-House veto.312 Powell’s opinion offers a useful summary
of the concerns that gave rise to the prohibition of congressional
adjudication and private legislation in the naturalization context.
Powell noted that “[o]ne abuse that was prevalent during the Confederation was the exercise of judicial power by the state legisla-

knowledgement that a class of cases can be better dealt with through “[public] legislation” than through a private bill).
310
See Griffith, supra note 309, at 302.
311
On the transfer of congressional discretion to the executive branch, see INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983); Griffith, supra note 309, at 278–79 (tracing the
transfer of discretionary authority from Congress to the executive branch). Griffith
reports that, as of 2004, only one person had obtained relief from the relatively harsh
provisions of AEDPA. Id. at 276, 293.
312
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 919. As noted above, Chadha sought judicial review of the
agency’s decision to give effect to the House’s determination. See supra notes 265–66
and accompanying text.
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tures,” and that the Framers were familiar with the dangers of such
a practice.313 In order to avoid such dangers, the Framers had created a tripartite system dependent on a separation of the powers of
the three branches.314 In addition to these structural protections,
Powell noted that the bill of attainder clause, Article I, Section 9,
also lent support to the “Framers’ concern that trial by legislature
lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse of power.”315 In
the end, Powell concluded that congressional exercise of an adjudicatory role lacks the sort of checks that “prevent it from arbitrarily
depriving [aliens] of the right to remain in this country.”316
Although his account of the Framers’ distrust of legislative adjudication attracted some sympathy, the other Justices leveled an
important criticism at Justice Powell’s approach. Powell based his
conclusion on general separation-of-powers principles, arguing that
such principles foreclosed Congress from playing an adjudicatory
role.317 But as the majority and dissent alike observed,318 the federal
courts often lacked statutory authority to review certain discretionary decisions of the Attorney General relating to relief from
deportation. The absence of any judicial role raised doubts about
Powell’s assertion that Congress had arrogated to itself a function
that was inherently judicial. But Powell could have sidestepped
that concern by deploying the naturalization clause. The clause
forecloses Congress from exercising case-by-case authority in immigration matters, quite without regard to whether such individual
decisions can best be conceptualized as administrative or judicial in
character. On this view, the Constitution would require Congress
to delegate the application of standards to other branches, thus
barring Congress from performing the work itself or retaining a
power to review the work of other branches (as it did in Chadha).

313
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 961 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that “Jefferson observed
that members of the General Assembly in his native Virginia had not been prevented
from assuming judicial power, and ‘[t]hey have accordingly in many instances decided
rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy’” (quoting The Federalist
No. 48, at 336 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961) (quoting Thomas Jefferson,
Notes on the State of Virginia 196 (London ed. 1787)))).
314
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 962.
315
Id.
316
Id. at 966.
317
Id. at 962.
318
Id. at 957 n.22; id. at 1001–02 (White, J., dissenting).
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D. No Public Rights Doctrine
Our criticisms of the plenary power doctrine and the adoption of
private legislation lead us to question the application of the “public
rights” doctrine to issues of immigration and naturalization law. In
general, the public rights doctrine holds that Congress may assign
disputes involving the federal government to Article I tribunals,
the judges of which lack the salary and tenure protections required
by Article III.319 In a leading discussion, albeit one not essential to
its holding, the Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson included immigration issues on the list of disputes in the public rights category.320 In doing so, the Court relied upon plenary power cases
from the nineteenth century.321 In other words, the Court has taken
the position that Congress’s plenary power over issues of immigra-

319
An elaborate jurisprudence now governs the power of Congress to assign federal
claims to non-Article III courts. For descriptions and criticisms of the doctrine, see
Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Federal Power
53–82 (2d ed. 1990); Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring up Article
III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 85
(1988). The Court first gave voice to the public rights exception in 1855, upholding the
power of Congress to provide for the issuance of a distress warrant on the basis of executive branch, rather than judicial branch, determination of the factual predicate for
a claim that an individual owed money to the federal government. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855) (identifying
“matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which [C]ongress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the
courts of the United States, as it may deem proper”). Thus, the doctrine refers to the
“public right” to recover money owed to government.
320
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 (1932). The Crowell Court included
the following within the public rights category: “interstate and foreign commerce,
taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the facilities of the post office,
pensions, and payments to veterans.” Id. at 51.
321
In justifying the inclusion of immigration cases within the public rights doctrine,
see id. at 51 n.13, the Court’s accompanying footnote referred to United States v. Ju
Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905). In Ju Toy, the Court refused to order a judicial determination of a claim of citizenship by one detained at the border. Ju Toy, in turn, relied on Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892), and Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893), two plenary power cases. The application of
the public rights doctrine thus grows out of the Court’s conception that Congress has
plenary power over immigration matters. Professor Richard Fallon has identified an
explicit link between the plenary power doctrine and the view that immigration issues
present matters of public right that can be consigned to non-Article III tribunals, although he questions the persuasiveness of that conclusion. See Fallon, supra note 14,
at 967.
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tion and naturalization law includes a power to assign the final
resolution of disputes over the application of the rules to nonArticle III tribunals and curtail the federal judicial role.
Relying on the public rights/plenary power decisions, Congress
has assigned the determination of a broad range of immigration
matters, including initial entry and removal decisions, to administrative agencies. Immigrants seeking judicial review of these
agency determinations face the usual sorts of constraints imposed
by administrative law.322 Congress sometimes goes further, as it did
in the AEDPA and IIRIRA, curtailing all judicial review by giving
binding effect to the agency’s determination.323 The perceived absence of any substantive constitutional constraints on Congress’s
power over immigration matters contributes to the perception that
Article III courts have no distinctive role to play.324 Or, to put it a
slightly different way, if Congress can deny entry into the country
and citizenship altogether, then perhaps it can confer these privileges on whatever terms it chooses, and limit access to judicial review.325 One version of this idea was captured in the Court’s notion
that whatever Congress prescribes “is due process as far as the
alien denied entry is concerned.”326
Yet despite occasional assertions to the contrary, the public
rights doctrine provides little justification for the curtailment of ju322
For an overview of the administrative law issues in immigration and asylum cases,
see Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the
Limits to Consistency, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 413 (2007).
323
For a description of the jurisdictional curtailment in AEDPA and IIRIRA, see
Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 Cornell L.
Rev. 369, 380–84 (2006). See generally Neuman, Immigration Law, supra note 291, at
1695 (noting, among other things, the restrictions on judicial review of orders for removal of deportable aliens in the two laws).
324
As Professor Daniel Meltzer observed, it seems odd to suggest that aliens may
lack substantive constitutional rights but possess a right to judicial review. Meltzer,
supra note 16, at 2571.
325
See Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative
State, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 30 n.162 (2002) (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 399 & n.2 (1938)), “which characterized deportation as ‘revocation of a
privilege voluntarily granted’”; Milton M. Carrow, The Background of Administrative
Law 21, 62 (1948), which characterized immigration issues as involving the loss of
government privileges or benefits; J. Roland Pennock, Administration and the Rule
of Law 163 (1941), which concluded that immigration cases have received only limited
judicial review because they fall into the broad category of “suits arising out of gratuities or favors granted by the government.”
326
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
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dicial review in the immigration arena.327 Although we often think
of the public rights doctrine as a monolithic reference to any litigation that involves the federal government as a party,328 the doctrine
actually consists of two separate strands. In one strand, individuals
pursue claims for the payment of government benefits, such as the
invalid pension claims that troubled the circuit courts in Hayburn’s
Case and the social security claims that many disabled Americans
file today.329 In a second strand, exemplified by Murray’s Lessee v.
Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.,330 individuals seek to recoup
the losses they suffer through the allegedly unlawful conduct of the
government: taxes wrongly collected, property wrongly taken, government contracts breached, search or arrest warrants improperly
executed, persons wrongly detained or imprisoned.331 These matters
may give rise to litigation with the federal government or with its
individual agencies or officers depending on the forms of action
and jurisdictional grants available to the federal courts.
These two strands of the public rights doctrine rest on different
foundations and provide different justifications for the exercise of
congressional control. In the case of government benefits, Congress, exercising its appropriations power, has the power to retain
for itself the task of distributing funds.332 Alternatively, Congress
can transfer the decision about the distribution of government largesse to a government agency, as it did, for example, with the dis-

327
Recent cases find that the judicial role has survived legislation that appears to
have been designed to immunize agency decisions from federal judicial oversight. See
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314
(2001).
328
The Court has suggested that the public rights doctrine may extend to certain
kinds of private litigation that take place in the shadow of a complex regulatory
scheme. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571 (1985).
329
See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). For an account of the litigation,
see Pfander, supra note 14, at 699–704.
330
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
331
In each of these exemplary cases, the individual could claim an invasion of life,
liberty, or property, the traditional common law triggers of judicial review.
332
Thus, during the early Republic, Congress considered private money claims
against the United States through its committees and adopted an appropriations bill
to pay well-founded claims. See Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against
the United States: The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of
Payment, 45 La. L. Rev. 625, 626–27 (1985).
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tribution of public lands.333 Finally, Congress can give authority to
the federal courts to hear the matter, provided it has made provision for the courts to act with the finality that Article III demands.
If Congress wishes to preserve a measure of control, then it can assign the decision to a legislative court or non-Article III tribunal
and oversee the benefit determinations of that body. The story of
veteran benefits in the early Republic follows this pattern; Congress initially empowered the War Department to adjust the claims
and then transferred them to the courts, albeit without sufficient
finality to enable the courts to proceed.334 Eventually, Congress
called upon commissioners to make the initial determination, followed by administrative and legislative review.335 The treatment of
these benefit determinations might provide a predicate for the denial of judicial review over immigration and naturalization matters.
Along with the benefit strand, the Court has invoked the public
rights doctrine of Murray’s Lessee as the basis for Congress to bypass judicial review.336 But one can question the analogy. The famous dictum in Murray’s Lessee does not uphold any power in
Congress to sidestep judicial review altogether (although Congress
has no obligation to open the courts to a claim against the government). Rather, it was a question of timing; judicial review could occur at the threshold, if the government brought suit to collect the
333
On the use of executive officers to distribute public lands, see Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 566, 577–80 (2007).
334
See James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial
Power in the Early Republic, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 35–40 (2008).
335
Today, in the areas of social security and veteran’s benefits, Congress has given
agencies the power to make final benefit decisions, thereby clearing the way for judicial review. See Pfander, supra note 14, at 747 n.492.
336
For the dictum, suggesting that Congress may grant or withhold a judicial forum,
see supra note 319. To understand the dictum, one must understand that the statutory
scheme empowered the government to distrain or seize an individual’s property to
satisfy a government debt and it gave the government good title to the property on
the date of the seizure. (This gave the government priority in a race to the debtor’s
assets; the other creditors had to obtain a judgment first and then seize the property
in satisfaction.) If the debtor wished to contest the seizure of property on the ground
that no debt was owed, the common law would furnish a remedy in the form of a suit
against the marshal. But instead of relying on that common law remedy, the statute in
question allowed the debtor to post a bond for the value of the property and file suit
against the government to restrain the seizure and return the property. Thus, the seizure (or bond) would secure the government’s financial interest during orderly litigation over the legality of the alleged debt. The Court recognized that Congress could
control the timing, but not the existence, of judicial review.

PFANDER _WARDON_PREPP

2010]

Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution

3/18/2010 12:47 PM

437

debt, or it could occur after the seizure of property at the suit of
the debtor. The true lesson of Murray’s Lessee, then, is one of respect for common law remedies as the bedrock source of the right
to judicial review, coupled with a recognition that Congress necessarily has discretion over the nature and timing of such review. The
Court tried to make this clear, stressing that Congress cannot
“withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law.”337 Note that
Murray’s Lessee involved the seizure of property, the sort of government activity that traditionally gave rise to common law remedies in trespass. Other classic common law remedies include the assumpsit action to challenge the wrongful exaction of taxes, the
mandamus proceeding to compel government action, and the habeas remedy for wrongful imprisonment or detention.338 As to all of
these government interactions, Murray’s Lessee suggests that
common law remedies define the constitutional minimum, even in
cases involving litigation with the government or its officers that
fall squarely within the traditional understanding of the public
rights doctrine.
Yet the Murray’s Lessee dictum has been misunderstood by
those who assume that the Court meant to recognize Congress’s
authority to control not just the timing of judicial review, but also
its ultimate availability. The Court’s summary of the public rights
doctrine in Crowell v. Benson provides a good example of the confusion. The Crowell dispute itself involved a matter of private
rights and the Court took pains to preserve judicial review. Yet in
summarizing the scope of the public rights doctrine, the Crowell
majority explained that public rights were matters that Congress
could reserve to itself, delegate to executive officials, or commit to

337
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
284 (1856); see also John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 Yale L.J. 524 (2005)
(tracing the common law origins of the duty of government to provide a right to redress).
338
On the use of suits against government officers to challenge invasions of life, liberty, and property, see David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive
Government Wrongs, 44 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1972); Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 396, 399 (1987). On the
special role of habeas corpus litigation in securing review of the legality of custody in
immigration, see Neuman, Habeas Corpus, supra note 1.
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judicial tribunals.339 In support of that proposition, the Court cited a
case in which the Court concluded that the court of customs appeals was to be regarded as an Article I court to which the judicial
power of the United States did not extend.340 The Court went on to
list the proceedings that came within the scope of the public rights
doctrine, including disputes over immigration, taxation, public
lands, and veteran benefits.341 The discussion thus mixed the two
strands of public rights cases together as if they all entailed the
same measure of congressional control.
In regulating immigration and naturalization, Congress cannot
exercise untrammeled control of judicial review under either
strand of the public rights doctrine. Under the first strand of the
doctrine, one might argue that Congress can distribute the benefits
of immigration as it sees fit, granting or withholding the privilege
of entry and citizenship, transferring discretion to the executive
branch, or providing for judicial determination of such matters. But
recall that Congress does not enjoy the power, under the naturalization clause, to grant or withhold the privileges of naturalization
on a case-by-case basis. Rather, the requirement that Congress establish a uniform rule precludes such discretionary determinations
and bars Congress from either adjudicating immigration claims or
passing private bills to confer rights on particular immigrants. As
we saw in Part II, early Congresses respected these limits: they refrained from passing private legislation and delegated the determination of discretionary matters to the courts. The 1790 Act called
for common law courts of record to decide, essentially as a matter
of discretion since no statutory criteria existed, if the applicant was
a person of “good moral character.”342 While Congress has broad
power over immigration, in short, it lacks the sort of power to
make discretionary decisions that it enjoys over the appropriation
of government revenues and distribution of government property
(such as public land).343 Congress can create a framework for the
339

See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
See id. at 50–51 (citing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
Id. at 51.
342
See supra note 152.
343
The contrast in constitutional language confirms this conclusion. Compare U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (providing for Congress to establish a uniform rule of naturalization), with id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (empowering Congress to collect taxes to “pay the
Debts . . . of the United States”), and id. at art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (empowering Congress to
340
341
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resolution of immigration matters, and can place certain responsibility for the decisions in the executive branch, but cannot diminish
the judicial role by invoking its own authority to do as it sees fit.
The second strand of the doctrine holds that Congress can substitute for, but not displace, common law remedies against government officials. We can begin by acknowledging that aliens cannot claim a right, at common law, to citizenship by virtue of
extended residence or good behavior. The common law did not
recognize a right to citizenship by adverse possession. Yet aliens
who established a lawful residence in the United States were entitled to the benefit of existing naturalization rules, free from any
retrospective changes. Judicial intervention may be required to enforce these constitutional limits on congressional control. Moreover, in the course of administering immigration rules, the federal
government often takes individuals into custody, either to prevent
their entry into the country or in connection with deportation proceedings.344 Individuals subject to custody imposed by executive decree, rather than through judicial process, have long enjoyed the
right at common law to test the legality of their confinement by filing a petition for the writ of habeas corpus.345 Viewed within the
framework of Murray’s Lessee, this common law right to habeas
corpus suggests that Congress may substitute alternative forms of
judicial review but cannot foreclose access to Article III courts for
an evaluation of the legality of custody.
Much the same conclusion emerges from the non-suspension
clause, which prohibits suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus except in times of invasion or rebellion. As the
Court explained in Boumediene v. Bush, the non-suspension clause
operates to guarantee the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
an equally effective alternative mode of judicial review.346 Congress
“dispose of” and make “all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States”). Thus, while the naturalization clause
requires Congress to establish a uniform rule, the spending and property clauses impose no restrictions.
344
See Neuman, Extraterritorial Constitution, supra note 294, at 286 (exploring the
importance of custody as a predicate for judicial review).
345
See Neuman, Habeas Corpus, supra note 1, at 985.
346
See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2247 (2008). For an account of the implications of Boumediene for the extension of constitutional doctrine overseas, see
Neuman, Extraterritorial Constitution, supra note 294, at 268–74.
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violates the non-suspension clause when it eliminates the habeas
remedy and substitutes a constitutionally inadequate alternative
form of relief. Important elements of the Court’s opinion extend to
the immigration context.347 While the statute at issue in Boumediene provided for review of legal issues in federal appellate court, it
did not offer detainees an opportunity to supplement the record
and obtain a full airing of the facts.348 Accordingly, the Court invalidated the restrictions on habeas jurisdiction set forth in the
Military Commissions Act (“MCA”).349 In so doing, the Court acknowledged that the need for searching review was most pressing
when an individual was confined pursuant to an executive order,
rather than through the usual processes of criminal law.350 That reasoning can—and should—be extended to the immigration context.
CONCLUSION
Much has changed since the Constitution was framed in 1787. In
the pre-industrial world of the early Republic, ownership of land
was central to the promise of life in the new world and, for immigrants, naturalized citizenship was central to the ownership of land.
Today, by contrast, immigrants are drawn to educational opportunities and well-paying jobs in an industrial economy; ownership of
land no longer exerts the same attraction, and access to naturalized
citizenship no longer fully defines the scope of the nation’s immigration policy. Immigrants may come for jobs or for an education
with every expectation that they will return to their countries of
origin without seeking naturalized citizenship. Changes in the nature of mobility and work have driven a wedge between the rules
that govern immigration and those that regulate naturalization.
347

The Boumediene Court first concluded that the constitutional privilege of seeking
habeas review extended to Guantanamo detainees. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262.
Next, the Court considered whether the review that Congress had made available, in
the D.C. Circuit, served as an adequate substitute for the habeas review that it had
curtailed. Id. at 2262.
348
Id. at 2272.
349
Id. at 2274.
350
Id. at 2277. Accordingly, the Court found that any substitute for habeas must
have the means to correct errors in the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”)
proceeding, to assess the sufficiency of the government’s showing, to consider relevant exculpatory evidence, and to allow the petitioner to supplement the record on
review. Id. at 2270.
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Yet despite the modern gap that now separates immigration and
naturalization law, the constitutional experience of the early Republic has lessons to teach us. Framed at a time when the nation
welcomed (white) immigrants as prospective citizens, the naturalization Constitution of the early Republic refutes the broadest
claims of plenary congressional power. Congress was not given untrammeled power to regulate (immigration and) naturalization but
was required to “establish a uniform rule.” Embedded in this provision were norms of prospectivity, uniformity, and transparency:
Congress was to act by public law, creating a framework within
which executive and judicial officers would administer naturalization law. Congress was neither to change the rules that apply to
resident aliens, lawfully present in the United States, nor to exercise case-by-case control of naturalization decisions.
These conclusions call into question three features of modern
immigration law, including the much-criticized plenary power doctrine. While Congress does enjoy broad power to define the requirements for admission to naturalized citizenship and to limit entry into the country, the plenary power doctrine wrongly translates
this control into unlimited authority over those who have already
established a residence in the United States. As we have seen, the
Framers of the Constitution and the drafters of the nation’s first
naturalization law did not share this view. The early Republic also
rejected the use of private bills as a mode of conferring naturalized
citizenship. While the Framers were familiar with this form of
naturalization, they rejected the practice of private legislation (and
the inconsistency and corruption such practice encourages) in favor
of requiring Congress to adopt public laws of general applicability.
These conclusions leave little room for the operation of a special
public rights doctrine as a predicate for the restriction of judicial
review over immigration and naturalization matters. Congress can
certainly assign immigration matters to non-Article III tribunals
for initial adjudication, subject to the usual rules that govern judicial review. Congress surely has broad power to regulate and channel the exercise of judicial oversight. But neither the plenary power
doctrine nor the nature of Congress’s regulatory authority provides
a foundation for curtailing the oversight role of the federal courts.

